Other Transitions: Multiple Economies of Moscow Households in the 1990s

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This article examines survival strategies of urban households in post-socialist cities during the transition from the Soviet system to a market economy. The article links the outcomes of systemic transformation to the daily lives of households and connects urban change induced by mass privatization to class and gender processes inside the households. These “other transitions” in everyday class and gender processes are consistently overlooked by macroeconomic approaches that dominate among transition theorists and policy consultants. The focus is on households in a Moscow neighborhood who attempt to meet the competing demands of earning income, fulfilling domestic responsibilities, and securing child care in a rapidly changing urban context. The diverse formal and informal economic practices of households are analyzed using the model of “multiple economies” that include paid work, informal work for cash, unpaid domestic labor, and help in kind, labor, and cash from networks of extended family, friends, and neighbors. Mapping the typically invisible transformations of multiple economies of households contributes to creating alternative geographies of transition that are rooted in daily household experiences, acknowledges the existence of multiple economies practices, and emphasizes their importance for household social reproduction.

The research combined qualitative interviewing with GIS (geographic information systems) in order to develop the model of multiple economies, elicit household perspectives on urban change, and provide the information for mapping of the landscape of multiple economies. GIS was also used to understand the dynamics of local urban change resulting from privatization. Key Words: Moscow, transition, multiple economies, households, everyday life.

One might think of Russia today as the first truly “post-structural” society, rejecting administered visions and investments in the future and held together by a system of personal ties.

—(Burawoy 2001, 1113)

In the course of this year, our past and future have exchanged places. The principal problem posed by this year is no longer a (derivative) social or a political one, but rather an eschatological one: how to live after one’s own future or, if you like, after one’s own death.

—(Epstein 1995, 71)

The closing decade of the 20th century witnessed the collapse of the Soviet block and its “transition” to a Western-style society. In one intense lurching effort, the former “socialist” giant transformed itself into its “capitalist” antipode by implementing policies of transition, also known as structural adjustment policies. Large urban centers such as Moscow have become the primary sites of capitalist expansion while still embracing legacies of Soviet planning and industrial development. The result is complex and often contradictory reconfigurations of urban spaces that influence class and gender relations within Moscow households. The economic and social practices that constitute the daily lives of households have been transformed in dramatic and unforeseen ways, especially in the context of a deep economic crisis triggered by the transition to a market economy. In order to sustain their households and combine work, domestic labor, and child care under new circumstances, people radically change their occupations, take on multiple jobs, work informally, increase domestic production of goods and services, and rely extensively on networks of extended family, relatives, and friends. To meet their daily needs and survive, households demonstrate unprecedented creativity in using all available resources and inventing the new ones.

These fundamental changes in the daily lives of ordinary households or, as I call them, “other transitions,” are entirely overlooked by standard theories of transition and are not addressed by their resultant policies. The post-Soviet transition to capitalism is commonly described as a systemic change that includes a triple transformation of central planning into a market-based economy, of totalitarianism into democracy, and of the empire into nation-states (Ofie 1991; Lapidus 1995; Dallin 1995; Bradshaw 1997). Such an approach focuses
on macro-level and national scale processes and, while important, ignores the locally defined outcomes of national transition policies and the experiences of ordinary people. In addition, the transition to a market economy is presented as a complete break with past economic and social relations. The impression is that these relations should have been destroyed by the structural adjustment policies and that post-Soviet society, totally renewed, should start from scratch, giving all its members the same chance to succeed in an impersonal but fair market competition. At the same time, Soviet-era class and gender hierarchies continue to play an important role in shaping new social and economic realities and in determining the nature of the “other transitions” in the daily lives of ordinary households. The dominant discourse of transition fails to see the many “other transitions” that accompany the restructuring of industries and regions because these equally fundamental transitions take place at finer geographic scales and within the realm of the everyday life.

Geographers have been especially sensitive to the spatiality of social processes and the consequences of “scaling” processes and places (N. Smith 1993). Recently, a number of scholars have specifically addressed the socially constructed nature of scale and how it influences the production of knowledge and politics (N. Smith 1993; Swyngedouw 1997; Marston 2000; Brenner 2001; Marston and Smith 2001). Representing the transition as a national scale process leads to national-level policy decisions and evaluations based on macroeconomic indicators. At the same time, there is a lack of scientific knowledge and informed decisions at other geographic scales, which in turn influences how new social realities are being created in local contexts. In summarizing the current debate on the social construction of scale, Marston (2000, 221) notes: “Scale-making is not only a rhetorical practice; its consequences are inscribed in and are the outcome of, both everyday life and macro-level social structures.” Furthermore, geographic scales do not exist in separation from each other. Instead, social processes and places are simultaneously produced at multiple scales, and geographic scale is a relational concept (Marston 2000; Brenner 2001). Thus, there is a need to envision the transition as a sociospatial process that is contested across multiple scales by different actors, from the state and institutions to households and individuals. “Rescaling” the Russian transition in order to connect national structural change, transformation of local urban spaces, and household experiences, remains an unfulfilled task.

A related problem is that the theory of transition does not provide the conceptual language and analytical instruments needed to understand transformations at the scale of households (Marston 2000). While transition analysts measure the progress of economic transformation (or its failure) by using such indicators as industrial output or rate of inflation, the profound changes in the daily lives of households (see quote from Epstein [1995] above and Alexandra’s household story later in this article) remain untheorized, unnoticed, and reported only through scant journalistic work. Even the indicators that describe the well-being of people instead of the economic system (e.g., average income, unemployment rates, and poverty levels) can only outline the hardships of post-Soviet society as a whole and do not describe the complexity of daily economic struggles. Because households use both formal and informal resources and employ economic and social practices not reflected in statistics, these indicators will simply misrepresent people’s everyday lives. As opposed to the national structural adjustment measures that have been a primary concern of state policies, these daily strategies are ignored and households receive little direct or policy-based support; instead, household resources are stretched ever thinner. At the same time, social theorists have long argued for the importance of the practices of everyday life in structuring social processes and shaping social structures, institutions, and class and gender relations (Lefebvre 1971; Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Rose 1993; Hanson and Pratt 1995). Therefore, extending imagination of the transition to everyday economic and social practices is fundamental for understanding the nature of the current change and its implications for ordinary households.

Studies that critically examine the transition in Russia and East Europe at fine geographic scales and with a focus on the everyday lives of people are lacking (for exceptions, see volumes edited by Pickles and Smith [1998] and Burawoy and Verdery [1999] as well as work by Rose 1994; Clarke 1998; A. Smith 2000, and Pavlovskaya and Hanson 2001). This article attempts to fill this gap by switching the analysis of transition to the scale of an urban neighborhood and to the everyday lives of households living there. The major goal is to elaborate a conceptual model for understanding changes in the diverse economic and social daily practices of urban households or the “other transitions” triggered by the introduction of a market economy and rampant urban privatization. This graphically presented model, a model of “multiple economies,” incorporates a whole range of formal and informal types of work and allows for the theorization of corresponding class and gender processes. By linking economic activities that are usually analytically separate, the model captures the complexity and
contradictions of a household’s position within “multiple economies.” These complexities and contradictions are fundamental for understanding people’s daily experiences in the context of rapid economic and urban change. Furthermore, by comparing the multiple economies of households in the Soviet and post-Soviet era, the model enables analysis of the continuity of class and gender hierarchies. This analysis, however, is beyond the scope of the current article.

The second goal is to use the model for the empirical documentation, analysis, and visualization of multiple economies in Moscow households. Representing their changing but hidden landscape through mapping serves not only to theorize but also to create alternative geographies of transition. These alternative geographies are rooted in the everyday lives of Moscow households and are sensitive to local-scale processes of change. To achieve these goals, I combined in-depth interviews with households living in a small portion of downtown Moscow with a GIS-based analysis and mapping of multiple economies and local urban space.

After describing the research design and methodology, I elaborate the model of multiple economies using relevant literatures and interview data. Drawing on the interview with one household, I illustrate how the model of multiple economies can account for the complexities of daily life during the transition. Finally, I introduce GIS-based maps of multiple economies of the interviewed households and analyze their transformation since the beginning of the transition. The conclusion summarizes the contribution of this approach to understanding the transition in Moscow and social transformation in general.

Research Design and Study Area

Investigating the daily experiences of households and the impact of the changing urban context required abandoning a macrogeographic scale of analysis and turning to a local and household scale. In addition, it required a research methodology that combined qualitative interviews with a GIS-based analysis of local urban change. This methodology was informed by feminist geographic scholarship and research in critical cartography and GIS (Harley 1988; Hanson and Pratt 1995; Jones, Nast, and Roberts 1997; Hanson 1997; Huffman 1997; Elwood and Martin 2000; Kwan 2002a, b; McLafferty 2002). Mixing methodologies allowed me to analyze household experiences with respect to the microgeographies of urban change (Pavlovskaya 2002).

To analyze the specifics of local urban change, I selected a small portion of downtown Moscow (Figure 1) as my study area. Downtown Moscow underwent a massive urban change triggered by the privatization of the economy and housing in the early 1990s (Gritsai 1997a, b; Gdaniec 1997a, b; Vendina 1997). Focusing on this neighborhood next to Kitai-Gorod, I used phonebook directories for 1989 (before privatization) and 1995 (after privatization) to collect fine-scale data on types and location of all urban establishments present at these two dates. These data were classified using the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS), mapped at the scale of building footprints, and analyzed using GIS to determine the nature of change after privatization (Pavlovskaya, under review).

In addition, I conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with households with young children residing in this portion of Moscow. Their approximate locations are shown in Figure 1. A total of 45 in-depth interviews with the members of 30 single- and two-parent households were conducted in 1995 (see Table 1); follow-up phone interviews with selected households took place in 2000. Households were randomly selected from local school lists (where children attended grades 1 to 3), but the sample was stratified to ensure that two-parent and single-parent families are adequately represented (one-third of the households were single-parent). Given the financial, labor, and time costs of child care, I assumed that families with young children had to be creative in...
coping with the economic hardships of transition and were sensitive to the presence or absence of local resources and services. Respondents had different educational levels and diverse occupations, they held jobs in private and state sectors, and some were not employed. They lived in differently structured households (extended or nuclear) and in different apartments (separate, communal, privatized, or municipal). Interviews focused on the respondents’ work histories, domestic responsibilities, and uses of urban establishments in their neighborhood before and after privatization. The interviews were coded and analyzed using a grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Miles and Huberman 1994). The results of the qualitative interview analysis were used to elaborate a household perspective on urban change (Pavlovskaya and Hanson 2001). The interviews also provided data that would inform the development of a model of multiple economies, their analysis relative to the overlooked “transitions” of households, and their GIS-based mapping in the study area.

Alexandra’s Story

In-depth interviewing provided a means to elicit household experiences of the current economic change. All household stories describe multiple and dramatic changes in people’s everyday lives. They are accounts of how these households “live after the future” (Epstein 1995)—or live in capitalism after the never-achieved communism—amidst the intense transformation of economic, social, and labor relations. The story of a single parent whom I will call Alexandra is one such example. While Alexandra’s life circumstances are unique, much of her experience is similar to other households in post-Soviet Moscow in terms of complexity of economic arrangements that underpin their daily lives. I use her story because it best reveals the many contradictory economic practices and helps to articulate the theoretical argument that is a focus of this article (see Pavlovskaya and Hanson [2001] for another household story). Alexandra’s story was recorded in 1995, just a few years after the beginning of the transition to a market economy in 1992.

Alexandra is a police officer at an international airport and a single parent with 10-year-old twin sons. She works 12-hour shifts and commutes on public transportation two hours each way. Alexandra’s mother, grandmother of the children, is a retired lawyer. Grandmother has her own little apartment, but lives with Alexandra to shop, clean, cook, and supervise the children before and after school. All four share Alexandra’s small one-room apartment, where the kitchen serves as a bedroom at night. She received it after her parents’ communal apartment was finally resettled. Then single, Alexandra was very happy to have a place of her own, but when her sons arrived, she requested a larger apartment. According to city rules, however, their living space was within acceptable limits. Alexandra then enrolled on a waiting list with the police department for housing improvement, but when the Soviet system collapsed, her request was cancelled after many years of waiting.

As housing, education, and health care under the Soviet system were free, Alexandra’s household daily needs were basically met by her salary, informal money contributions and gifts from her ex-husband and his friends and relatives, and her mother’s pension. By the mid-1990s, however, formal income hardly covered food, and her ex-husband no longer helped. The family cannot rent out her mother’s apartment because it stores everything they own (only a little fits into their one room). Although many new private stores and services have sprung up in their neighborhood, Alexandra’s mother travels to more distant but cheaper food and goods markets that became city outlets for a variety of informal trade. Their broken household appliances sit unused because prices in repair shops are too high. Friends cut her sons’ hair. Not owning a washing machine, they do most laundry and ironing by hand and use laundry services for bed sheets. Desperate for more income, Alexandra got involved in the widespread but technically illegal informal trade. She gave money to friends who bought consumer goods during trips abroad, and then she resold them at a small profit through her network of acquaintances. Although Alexandra and her mother, a firm believer in socialism and a World War II veteran, found this “job” embarrassing, it brought a much higher income than did her full-time job with the police. She hopes to quit both “jobs” and get a job in a private firm run by a friend, but for now, her formal job,

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1. Sample Households in 1995</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed Outside Home</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Single-parent households:</td>
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<td>Women</td>
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<td>Men</td>
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Source: Interview data.
where the housing benefit may be reinstated, is her only hope of improving their difficult housing situation.

Her and her mother’s tiny apartments are the only assets that Alexandra’s family received from the mass privatization of state property that allegedly was equally divided among all citizens. While they are relatively valuable, these apartments, if sold, would not bring enough money to purchase a larger apartment. Although the police department no longer allocates free housing, Alexandra hopes some day to receive a subsidy from her job to buy a larger apartment: “I gave so many years of service to the police, shouldn’t they finally give something back?”

Not only does her state employment no longer provide a living wage or guaranteed access to housing, it also no longer provides security. Alexandra has survived several layoffs that targeted women with children only because she had reluctantly disclosed her divorced status. Before, she had preferred her colleagues think she was separated.11

Theorizing Multiple Economies

Standard macroeconomic indicators cannot capture the complexity of and transitions in economic and social arrangements that are evident at the scale of Alexandra’s and many other households. To understand these experiences, we need to account for informal employment, networks of family and friends, and the simultaneity of multiple and gendered economic practices. The model of multiple economies I develop in the next two sections begins to tie these processes together by extending the post-structuralist concept of multiple or decentered identities to economic practices of post-Soviet households.

Multiple Identities, Class and Gender Processes

In all households interviewed, including Alexandra’s, household members performed several economic tasks (e.g., work for wages, housework, childcare, and so on) on a daily basis, allocated based on gender and with respect to the responsibilities of other individuals. These multiple and interrelated class and gender processes overlap in time and space and readily cross the perceived boundary between the household and the larger economy. In Alexandra’s household, paid work, housework, caring for children, raising an informal income, and solving their housing problem were distributed between Alexandra and her mother but both depended on each other in each of these tasks. For instance, Alexandra would not be able to support her household without her mother’s housework. Traditionally, however, research often focuses on one aspect of daily life such as work, consumption patterns, or child care. In this way, it tends to represent people as having one identity, usually related to their class, gender, sexuality, or ethnic/racial background, which is somehow disconnected from other dimensions of their lives. The resulting conceptual singularity of identity reduces the complexity of social experiences of men and women as it ignores temporal and spatial simultaneity of their class and gender positions in home, at work, and in their communities. For example, while Alexandra is an “employed” person and a “single parent,” neither of these categories can meaningfully describe her situation in isolation from the other or from her housing needs, informal job, and extended family network.

Over the last decade, feminist and post-structuralist critiques of masculinist discourse in geography and other social sciences helped to articulate an antiessentialist concept of multiple or decentered identities (Butler 1990; Massey 1993, 1997; Gibson-Graham 1996b; Pratt 1998; Gibson-Graham, Resnick, and Wolff 2000b). According to this perspective, simultaneous involvement in multiple economic, social, and cultural practices produces a human subjectivity that is best understood in terms of multidimensional, fluid, and even contradictory identities that always mutually constitute each other. Generally, the notion of identity as singular can be deconstructed at two levels. At one level, an individual identity is a contradictory outcome of difference in terms of class, gender, “race,” ethnicity, and sexuality (also caste, as in Nagar and Leitner 1998). At another level, the singularity of each of these dimensions is also questioned, and such basic identities as “suburban woman” (Dowling 1998) or “waged worker” (Gibson-Graham 1996a; Gibson-Graham, Resnick, and Wolff 2000b) are further complicated to account for difference within these categories. Identity formation is a complex process that, in addition to the structuring role of the social context, also involves the active role of the subjectivity. This article, however, does not explicitly focus on subjectivity of respondents but explores their multiple class and gender identities in relation to their simultaneous involvement in multiple economic activities at work and in the home.

It is helpful to think about multiple determinants of social identities using the concept of class as a process of production and appropriation of surplus labor as opposed to a social category (see Resnick and Wolff 1987; Gibson-Graham 1996b, and Gibson-Graham, Resnick, and Wolff 2000a for full consideration). Using too many or too few class categories can be analytically cumbersome or restrictive,12 but defining class as a process permits one
individual to participate in several class processes in different contexts. Alexandra, for instance, held several class identities because she was a waged employee, was informally self-employed, and contributed to domestic work between her shifts in the paid labor force.

In addition to multiple class identities, men and women often bear multiple and conflicting gender identities. Within geography, a well-established body of feminist work has explicitly addressed the connections among different types of work that women do on a daily basis, including domestic work and waged employment. These connections often result in restricted access to urban opportunities and in such labor market outcomes as shorter commuting times for women than for men, with the resulting concentration of women in female-dominated, less skilled, and lower paying jobs (Hanson and Pratt 1995; McLaugherty and Preston 1991, 1996; Katz and Monk 1993; Gilbert 1998; Preston, McLaugherty, and Liu 1998; Kwan 1999a, b). Thus, women, especially, are torn between their class and gender identities in the larger economy and within the home, which are also intimately connected. They even experience class and gender identity shifts while simply going to work or coming home from work (Gibson 1998; Pratt 1998).

Alexandra, too, constantly found herself at the intersections of many contradictory class and gender processes. She was exploited and underpaid at her formal job, but earned her real income informally and fully supported her household. While she only marginally participated in domestic labor, she was discriminated against at work because her boss assumed that, as a married mother, she was supported by her husband. To complicate this scenario even more, both adults in this household are women, but Alexandra clearly is in the traditional male role of “bread winner” or “wage earner” while her mother is in the traditional female role of “housewife.” Thus, post-Soviet class and gender identities are multiple and fluid and are a result of involvement in a web of gendered economic practices both inside and outside the home.

From Multiple Identities to Multiple Economies

Once the multiplicity and interconnectedness of class- and gender-based identities is recognized, we can envision the post-Soviet economy as consisting of multiple economies instead of its generalized characterization as “post-socialist” or “market-based.” Post-structuralist scholars have already begun deconstructing the hegemony of capitalism in analyses of the economic systems of Western societies (see Resnick and Wolff 1987; Fraad, Resnick, and Wolff 1994; Gibson-Graham 1996b; Gibson-Graham, Resnick, and Wolff 2000a; St. Martin 2001). They demonstrate that in modern post-industrial economies people participate in a whole range of economic practices on a daily basis, many of which can be defined in noncapitalist terms. Theorizing the presence of noncapitalist class processes, J. K. Gibson-Graham (1996a) proposed to decenter the capitalist economy (in a process similar to decentering identity), and, in so doing, to create space for multiple economic forms within capitalism.13

Coming from another theoretical perspective, the sociologist Mingione (1987) criticizes the assumption that in modern capitalist societies premodern (or, using post-structuralist language, noncapitalist) forms of labor do not exist. His research on the so-called household reproductive mix in urban families in post-Fordist Italy demonstrates that in late capitalism, market-based production and consumption do not alone provide for daily well-being, but instead, many economic activities, including formal and informal as well as cash-based and non-cash-based, contribute to the many resources necessary for household survival. As Alexandra’s story demonstrates, the concept of multiplicity of economic relations within a seemingly homogeneous social formation is especially relevant to Moscow households that are routinely engaged in various types of work both inside the home and in the larger economy. In the context of the transition in Russia, Richard Rose (1994), using survey-based studies, argues that Russian society is not modern in that Russians are able to get by only by relying on a “multiplicity of economies” instead of rational civil institutions. In his research on household survival in Slovakia, Adrian Smith (2000) finds that many household economic practices take place in decommodified space of noncapitalist relations.

Furthermore, David Stark’s (1992, 1996; also see Grabher and Stark 1998; Meurs and Begg 1998) articulation of path-dependency in post-socialist societies directly postulates the existence of mixed capitalist and noncapitalist economic institutions. Path-dependency holds that emerging social and economic practices are rooted in past institutions and continue to modify in response to the changing context. Therefore, socialism and capitalism are not as mutually exclusive as is commonly assumed, and, most importantly, a continuity between past and present institutional forms can be discerned. Although the path-dependency approach focuses on institutions, it also enables us to theorize a continuity of social hierarchies embedded within these two systems, including hierarchies of class and gender. Their importance is demonstrated by Alexandra’s struggle to stay employed. Shared by many other women
I interviewed, although their circumstances differed, this struggle is a combined result of both Soviet and post-Soviet gendering of the labor market made especially pronounced by the elimination of job security and increased job competition (see also Mezentseva 1992; Gruzdeva, Rzhansitsyna, and Khotkina 1993).

This theoretical work in combination with the interview data demonstrates that the post-Soviet economy is best understood in terms of multiple economic practices and their related class and gender processes. These practices are pulled together in the form of a conceptual model of multiple economies. The model accounts for the multiplicity of gendered economic activities within households and provides a basis for analyzing transitions between Soviet and post-Soviet household economies. In the following section, I discuss this model of multiple economies and its application to understanding these transitions.

**Sketching Multiple Economies**

The conceptual model of multiple economies is graphically presented in Figure 2. The model summarizes the experiences of Moscow households, but with appropriate modifications, it could be used for understanding the daily economic practices of households in other societies as well.

The model represents the economic space of households, a space constituted by multiple economies that are constructed by incorporating four dichotomies often used to characterize economic practices: formal and informal economies; monetized and nonmonetized economies; state and private sectors; and public and private spheres. While related, these paired concepts reflect different dimensions of the economy that are all important in consideration of daily economic practices of households. Moreover, the dichotomous categories are opposites of each other, with a seemingly hard boundary. In the model, however, the ends of each dichotomy are instead united by dashed lines indicating that their boundaries are permeable and fuzzy instead of solid and crisp. The goal for the model is to account for multiple properties of economic activities by bringing the dichotomies together and, in this way, to contribute to their conceptual deconstruction. The discussion below shows that, indeed, these dichotomous categories

![Figure 2. Multiple economies in the post-Soviet society. Source: Author.](image-url)
are not antithetical but continuous, and properties of multiple economies are interconnected and overlapping.

The left and the right parts of the model represent the dichotomy between the formal economy (on the left) and the informal economy (on the right, shaded gray to emphasize its informal status). The top and the bottom parts show the state (top) and private (bottom, also shaded gray because of its illegal status during the Soviet period) sectors, a crucial distinction in the discourse of transition from state socialism to market capitalism. The combination of these two dichotomies produces four quadrants that are then divided into two parts by superimposing the third dichotomy of monetized and nonmonetized economies. This division creates eight economic spaces or multiple economies with distinct characteristics. Examples are “the formal state monetized economy” (waged work) and the “informal private nonmonetized economy” (housework). The fourth and final dichotomy is that of the public and private spheres. In the model, it is represented by the two full circles that cross all multiple economies. The smaller inner circle corresponds to the private sphere of the household and its private space while the outer circle symbolizes the public sphere and urban public space. The boundaries between the public and private spheres are symbolically powerful but are routinely crossed in the course of everyday lives. For example, class and gender processes are constituted through practices that are rooted in both spheres through the connections between home and work. The private space of the household (small circle) is located in the center of the model to emphasize the position of household members at the intersection of multiple economies.

Because all these dichotomies are hierarchical, each pair has its privileged and unprivileged category. There is continuity between the privileged categories that are generally associated with the public sphere, male gender, waged work, formal economy, and monetized transactions. The unprivileged “other” categories are also interconnected and related to the private realm, female gender, unpaid work, and non-money-based transactions. Therefore, some of the multiple economies in the model, such as “the formal state monetized economy” in the upper left quadrant, combine all privileged properties while other economies, such as the “informal private nonmonetized economy” in the bottom right quadrant, have characteristics of the unprivileged economies only. The unprivileged economies have less importance in scientific and public discourses, while the privileged economies are at their center. In the model, all economies have equal size, which emphasizes their equal conceptual importance and often indispensable role in the everyday lives of households.

I also classified economic activities into two groups: household resource use\textsuperscript{15} and consumption practices. Their examples, typical for Soviet and post-Soviet periods, are listed within each segment (e.g., waged work, domestic work, help through network, profits, and so on). Thus, people might work for a wage and purchase goods and services in the “formal monetized state economy” that embraces various locations within public urban space, or they might do domestic work within the private spaces of their households (in the “informal nonmonetized private economy”). These groupings can then be used to make maps of multiple economies (see below). I shall now discuss these dichotomies in more detail and attempt to re-theorize them in the context of post-Soviet urban change.

Formal and Informal Economies

The division of economic and social activities into formal and informal (the left and right parts of the model in Figure 2) underlies, explicitly or implicitly, most research in social sciences. This research typically focuses on the formal economy because the officially recorded production of goods and services is readily available for analysis. Informal production and exchange (shown in gray) are absent from formal accounting (Waring 1990) and are poorly researched (unless crime-related) and unregulated. Although the fundamental daily practices of households encompass both formal and informal economies, only formal employment and consumption, for example, are analyzed and factored into calculations of macroeconomic indicators. This is not because they are the only factors affecting the well-being of households, but because they are relatively well documented and quantified.

Other “informal” practices, those not recorded or enumerated, escape scholarly attention even though they encompass a wide range of social arrangements, consume large inputs of labor, and affect power relations. In the case of Alexandra’s household and many others, practices such as informal work for cash, unpaid housework, and social networks of family and friends, truly constitute the basis for their daily existence. Through these practices, households redefine the outcomes of national transition policies and thus subvert the dominant structural conditions, as theorists of everyday life have long argued (Bourdieu 1977; de Certeau 1984; Giddens 1984). As these authors have suggested, lack of transparency also makes the informal practices potentially oppressive. Informal Soviet patriarchal culture, for example, persisted despite formal gender...
equality and led to the combined exploitation of women by the state and their male partners (Atkinson 1977; Gray 1989; Pilkington 1992; Voronina 1993). In the post-Soviet era, the position of women in the labor market remains precarious, as exemplified by Alexandra and other female respondents (see also Mezentseva 1992; Gruzdeva, Rzhanitsyna, and Khotkina 1993).

Focus on the Formal Economy

In scientific and popular economic discourses of modern societies, the formal economy becomes equated with the entire economic system and functions as its hegemonic form. While the existence of informal economies is sometimes allowed, it is assumed that their importance declines as societies urbanize and industrialize and provide mass-produced goods and services more efficiently. Thus, in economic theories of capitalism and socialism, the market economy and the centrally planned economy are constructed as respective formal economies of these social formations. As such, they are seen as the essential, dominant, and legitimate economic practices within each system, encompassing all employment and production of goods and services. As a result, little room is left for theorizing alternative economic spaces that might exist within these hegemonic systems. Following this simplified vision of socialism and capitalism, transition theory presents the economic transformation as a binary shift from the Soviet formal economy (upper left quadrant in Figure 2) to the capitalist formal economy (bottom left quadrant). Figure 3 illustrates such a unidirectional transformation. Other types of economies are shown in dark gray to signify their conceptual marginality.

Simultaneously, the theory of transition assumes that free market capitalism is the only viable alternative to all other economic forms (Sachs 1995; Lavigne 1995). Ironically, past Soviet economists argued the same about socialism and central planning. Transition theorists thus reduced the imagined outcome of the ongoing change to a few predefined capitalist institutions and processes. Assuming that socialism and capitalism are singular economic systems stifles our ability to imagine more complex economies that might involve capitalism (or socialism) as but one of many possible economic forms.

As Figure 3 makes clear, focus on the formal economy excludes many previously and presently ongoing economic and social practices. Obviously, it is impossible to describe these practices in exact terms for a variety of reasons including lack of data. Recent research has, however, demonstrated that the informal (or "second") economy played an important role under the Soviet system and during the transition. Tremil (1992) argues that the "second" economy (in the model, it is the state and private informal monetized economies), provided income for up to 12 percent of the Soviet work force. Earlier studies estimated that in Russia it accounted for up to 40 percent of household income and 30 to 40 percent of consumption outlays (Grossman 1989; see also Millar 1988). Although it was hoped that introducing private enterprise would encourage the informal sector to legalize its activities and pay taxes (Treml and Alexeev 1994), in 1996, the second economy produced an estimated 46 percent of Russia's GDP and quite possibly more in more recent years (Goble 1999).
Incorporating Informal Economies

A growing literature in economics and sociology has challenged the primacy of the formal economy in theory and practice. While many have recognized that substantial populations in the Third World depend on informal economies for their daily livelihood (Safa 1987; McGee 1988; Thomas 1995; Hays-Mitchell 2002), it is now clear that informal economies also play a surprisingly prominent role in advanced capitalist countries (Sassen-Koob 1987, 1991; Mingione 1987, 1994; Williams and Windebank 1993, 1998, 2000) and in the industrialized countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Grossman 1989; Treml 1992; Treml and Alexeev 1994; Sik 1994; Rose 1994). Apart from providing a survival strategy for immigrant groups, the informal economy is part of the system of advanced capitalism and the daily lives of nonimmigrant households (Mingione 1987, 1994; Sassen 1991; Rose 1994; Williams and Windebank 1998; Dasgupta 2000).

This research has not only expanded the geography of the informal sector but has also widened its definition. Previously limited to criminal activities, newer definitions include the informal production of otherwise licit goods and services, which takes place in an unregulated context (Castells and Portes 1989, 14–15; Sassen 1991, 81). New theories state that the informal economy is an “integral component of total national economies, rather than a marginal appendix to them,” which is growing “even in highly institutionalized economies, at the expense of already formalized work relationships” (Castells and Portes 1989, 13, 15–25). Informal employment grew most rapidly in the major urban centers of advanced economies during the post-Fordist age (Sassen 1991; Friedmann 1995) and has also expanded in the countries of Eastern Europe (Sik 1994). These developments contradict the traditional assumption that modern societies rely on the “ever-increasing importance” of wage labor, large manufacturing, the tertiary sector, and the bureaucracy of the nation-state (Mingione 1987; Rose 1994).

Although I shall analyze the multiple economies of households in detail at a later point, it is relevant to note here that, as Table 3 shows, the number of interviewed households where primary formal jobs are the major source of income has declined during the transition. In contrast, the role of complementary resources, including second and informal jobs has sharply increased. In addition, the interview data suggest that during the transition, the amount of domestic work increased despite the rapid growth of the private service sector (also see Pavlovskaya and Hanson 2001). Clearly, understanding the post-Soviet transformation and the everyday experiences of urban households is impossible as long as informal economic practices and their geographies remain ignored.

State and Private Sectors

The tension between the state sector and the private sector is often highlighted in economic theories, which commonly construct state intervention in opposition to the free market. Socialist theories advocate the eradication of the private sector, while neoliberal economists seek to eliminate state control. In contrast to other societies in transition, in post-Soviet Russia the tension between the shrinking state sector (the top half of the model in Figure 2 and Figure 3) and the expanding private sector (the bottom half of the model) is particularly strong. In the past, the state sector (shown in white) controlled all legal employment and most property, while private entrepreneurship (shown in gray) was banned or ignored. Consequently, privatization of the means of production, a core measure of structural adjustment policies, resulted in a large-scale transfer of property, resources, and labor from the state to the private sector. The legitimacy and the economic role of the latter have been increasing, and this is reflected in lighter gray in the model.

The assumed dichotomy of state and private sectors, however, requires critical examination. First, in some sense, private enterprise has always coexisted with the state sector in Russia in the form of the second economy. It functioned for private profit and included state enterprises and individual entrepreneurs. Second, while neoliberal economists link the success of transition to the elimination of state regulation, in all Western
societies the state owns property, provides employment, subsidizes private industries, and creates the rules according to which the free market operates. The rapid self-destruction of the state in Russia and its lack of control over privatization are now seen as major contributors to transition failure. Russian capitalism demonstrated that private markets do not generate wealth by themselves; instead, they are destructive and unstable and need tight control and regulation. Third, as theories of “nomenclatura capitalism” indicate, yesterday’s Soviet state executives and managers have become today’s property owners, revealing the continuity between the state and the private sector. In other words, post-socialist capitalism is firmly rooted in former Soviet state structures rather than replacing them (Stark 1992, 1996).

Finally, the connections between state and private sectors affect people’s everyday lives in important ways. Local governments and many state employers, for example, cut need-based allocations of housing, believing that the private housing market can better respond to consumer demand. But the current housing market caters only to the newly wealthy. As a result, many desperate individuals, including Alexandra and other people I interviewed, keep their poorly paid state jobs in the hope of improving their housing conditions. This situation severely restricts their employment opportunities in the private sector. The discursive dichotomy of the state and private sector sustains the neoliberal desire to completely replace state regulation with the free market. Its high costs include the inequalities of the privatization process, economic collapse, and the destruction of social policies in Russia.

**Monetized/Nonmonetized Economies**

Privileged monetized and unprivileged nonmonetized economic activities are found in all four quarters of the multiple economies model in Figure 2. While modern economies are seemingly founded on monetized transactions, under the Soviet system, many essential goods and services such as housing, education, child care, and health care were allocated in a nonmonetary form. In the model, these items are part of the state formal nonmonetized economy (in the upper left quadrant). Theories of transition, however, consider the nonmonetary mechanisms to be impediments to an efficient market-based distribution of goods and services. In Russia, most of these systems were irresponsibly dismantled in the 1990s, and no affordable market alternative has replaced them yet (see also Haney 1999).

Much of the exchange between enterprises, too, had occurred in a nonmonetary form (barter) and often “off-the-books” (the informal state nonmonetized economy in the upper-right quadrant). Along with the informal monetary transactions, this constituted the “second” Soviet economy that was to be eliminated by privatization. The 1990s have seen, however, an enormous increase in barter transactions between enterprises (up to 50 percent) and even in nonmonetary federal tax payments by the enterprises (up to 40 percent in 1997), according to Gaddy and Ickes (1998, 56; also see Woodruff 1999).

Nonmonetized economies outside the public sphere include household-based and social-networks-based production of goods and services (the informal private nonmonetized economies in the lower right quadrant of the model). While their fundamental role in sustaining households in the Third World has long been recognized, nonmonetized economies in modern urban societies are hardly acknowledged. The literature on the informal economy in industrialized countries is mostly concerned with cash-based production and ignores the role of domestic labor and network help (see, however, Pahl 1985, 1988). Yet reciprocity networks and family and kinship strategies “greatly condition individual economic behavior and strategies in every industrial context” (Mingione 1994, 24). Feminist scholars have long problematized the invisibility of domestic work and social networks and their role in structuring class and gender relations (Hartmann 1981; Reskin and Hartmann 1986). They have advocated putting a monetary value on domestic work and including it in indicators of economic growth (Waring 1990; Ferber and Nelson 1993; Samarasinghe 1997). More recently, performing unpaid domestic work has been designated by antiessentialist theorists as one of the most important class processes in modern Western households (Fraad, Resnick, and Wolff 1994; Gibson-Graham 1996b; Gibson 1998; Resnick and Wolff 2002), and feminist geographers have emphasized the impacts of domestic responsibilities on geographic access to employment (Hanson and Pratt 1995; Kwan 1999a).

In the Soviet Union unpaid housework remained a fundamental daily task despite the attempt to socialize household production and child care (see Resnick and Wolff 2002 for an antiessentialist Soviet household class analysis). The amount of required housework and barter transactions between households and via social networks has only increased during the transition. Some survey-based studies of post-Soviet societies point to the importance of these transactions for household survival (Rose 1994; Clarke 1998; A. Smith 2000), which is also true for the interviewed households. Table 3 shows that in some families help in kind or in the form of labor is...
Public and Private Spheres

The final dichotomy is that of the private and public spheres (shown with inner and outer circles in Figure 2). The symbolic separation between these spheres has long been criticized by feminist scholars, including geographers (McDowell 1983; Hanson and Pratt 1995; Domosh 1996; Staeheli 1996; Bondi and Domosh 1998), because it implicitly relegates women to the private sphere, housework, and social reproduction, and associates men with the public sphere, politics, and work for a wage. Aligned with other hierarchical dichotomies used in economic discourse, the separation of public and private perpetuates gender inequality and specifically marginalizes the private nonmonetized informal economies of households. It also obscures the fact that gender and class inequalities originate in both public and private spheres. In Figure 2, the public and private spheres cut across all multiple economies and are separated by dashed lines to indicate that their boundaries are permeable and are routinely bridged by daily economic and social practices.

Certain shared characteristics of the public and private spheres specifically point to the constructed nature of the differences between them. For example, the public sphere is usually linked to the formal monetized economy and waged work, while the nonmonetized and informal processes are conceptually relocated to the private realm. But, as Figure 2 shows, the public sphere also includes a whole range of nonmonetized mechanisms (e.g., free allocation of housing, education, and health care) and informal activities (e.g., the ubiquitous reliance on networks to secure employment), all very important in the daily lives of the interviewed households. Furthermore, the state informal sector flourished in the public sphere and included such things as privileges of Soviet-era government officials (the nonmonetized economy) and the underground “second” economy, which involved many state enterprises (the informal monetized economy). Private households, too, rely on a complex variety of monetized and nonmonetized resources. Overcoming the analytical separation between the public and the private is necessary for understanding how class and gender processes are simultaneously structured outside and inside the home.

Mainstream research on transitioning societies, however, continues to focus on public-sphere processes (e.g., production, work, or political participation) with little attention paid to such private-sphere activities as household reproduction. For example, the nonmarket enterprise behavior in post-Soviet societies has received scholarly attention (Ickes and Ryterman 1994; Gaddy and Ickes 1998; Grabher and Stark 1998; Pickles 1998), but the continued contribution of unpaid housework and social networks to social reproduction typically remains ignored. Combining all unprivileged properties, the informal nonmonetized economies of households are last on research agendas.

Private and Public Spaces

Because “social space is constituted out of social relations” (Massey 1997, 104, emphasis in original), public and private spheres are inscribed into urban spaces with their corresponding mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (Mitchell 1996). Although the private/public distinctions in Russia do not map directly to those in the West, the private space of a Moscow household—its apartment—often embraces notions of the private sphere (Shlapentokh 1989; Bym 1994), while the streets, stores, offices, workplaces, parks, and cultural facilities constitute city’s public spaces. While many public- and private-sphere practices are commonly mapped into corresponding urban spaces, the boundaries between these spaces are blurred and often transgressed (Bondi and Domosh 1998) in the ways relevant to Moscow households. For example, goods and services are produced not only at work places but also through unpaid housework within the private spaces of households. This labor, however, is excluded from most economic analysis, which is usually confined to paid labor in the public sphere (Hartmann 1981; Fraad, Resnick, and Wolff 1999).
“Kitchen-table politics” and paid work often performed in the private spaces are further examples of how public-sphere practices routinely transgress into the private space of the home (Christensen 1993; Mitchell 1996; Ahrentzen 1997; Mattingly 1999). The daily life of Alexandra’s household also rests on transgression of the boundaries between the public and the private and on connections, not separation, between the gendered economic practices occurring in the economic spaces conventionally characterized as public or private.

All of the multiple economies of Moscow are mediated by changing public and private urban spaces. For example, privatization of the economy and housing has created new urban geographies (Gritsai 1997a, b; Gadaniec 1997a, b; Pavlovskaya and Hanson 2001; Kolossov, Vendina, and O’Loughlin 2002; Pavlovskaya, under review) that, as will be shown in the next section, have influenced in important ways the multiple economies of ordinary households and, consequently, the class and gender relations in which their members participate.

Combining multiple economies in the graphic model demonstrates that the diverse economic practices in modern societies have often been overlooked as a result of an emphasis on those economic activities that combine the privileged characteristics found in the dichotomies considered above. Theories of socialism (both positive and critical) have been concerned with the formal state monetized economy while theories of capitalism have focused on market-based relations and transactions. Theories and policies of transition, too, have targeted the transformation of centrally planned formal economies into market-based systems (light grey in Figure 3 indicates the increasing legitimacy of the private sector), which left many other economic spaces invisible and unregulated despite their continued contribution to the everyday lives of households (dark grey in the model). Domestic economies, undervalued both empirically and theoretically, are especially marginal within the mainstream accounts of transition, and their link to employment and other formal economic practices remains ignored. The theoretical neglect of the unprivileged economic practices leads to a corresponding neglect of the relevant class and gender processes, creating potential for further class and gender exploitation and domination.

The increased domestic production of goods and services and the necessary mobilization of all other household resources have exerted tremendous pressures on urban families, as was particularly clear in Alexandra’s household. Using a model of multiple economies, we can now capture the complexity of and transitions in its daily economic struggles. “Mapping” this household into the model of multiple economies will show the economies upon which it depends, how they are interconnected, and how they are rooted in multiple economies of the Soviet era. Accounting for daily resources and consumption practices of a household will allow its comparison with other households. This will also provide a basis for a systematic investigation of transitions in class and gender processes, which will be presented elsewhere.

Alexandra’s Household in Multiple Economies

In general, I think, our well-being is the same as in the past, thanks to my efforts to maintain it. I am trying to keep up, to provide my children with at least something. The only difference is that in the past, I did not have to think where to get all these other sources of existence. . . . Today’s problem is how to survive.

—(Interview with Alexandra, 1995)

The model of multiple economies provides a key to understanding how Alexandra’s household manages to survive. The multiple economies specific to this household are presented in Figure 4. Its formal resources are spread between the formal state monetized and nonmonetized economies and include salary, pension, government allowances for her children, the two apart-
ments, the children’s school, and health care. If we limited consideration of the daily life of this household to the resources coming from the formal economy, the story would be incomplete. While Alexandra’s household appears to be doing well relative to households where no one is formally employed or to those with only a room in a communal apartment, we know that the formal accounting of resources and consumption can be misleading and does not incorporate important transitions in everyday life. For example, Alexandra’s household has a total official income (the state formal monetized economy) that does not allow a family of four to meet even minimal daily needs, such as expenses for food and clothes or payments related to education. Grandmother’s pension is too small, and Alexandra’s job with the police is not a source of income but a strategy to get a larger apartment. Deteriorated, underfinanced, and being dismantled, free education and health care, as well as housing inherited from the Soviet era, are still part of the state formal nonmonetized economy. These previously dominant systems continue to support the household’s everyday life, while the formal private healthcare, educational, and childcare services are effectively disconnected. Private stores are too expensive, and the housing market is not able to solve their housing problem. In fact, these pressures only strengthen the ties between Alexandra’s household and informal and non-market mechanisms. This situation is typical for almost all interviewed households. They continue to rely on nonmonetized state resources (child care, education, health care, housing) and avoid consuming in the formal private sector. Even those employed in private firms find the goods in most private stores and restaurants to be unaffordable.

A significant portion of resources in interviewed households, consequently, come from various “invisible” informal economies (the dark grey portion of the model). For Alexandra, the informal private monetized economy provides the major source of income in the form of informal trade. Her ability to raise this income and her potential employment opportunities are linked to a network of friends. Similarly, adults from other interviewed households often had additional income sources and relied on networks of friends or relatives to get either formal or informal jobs (see Table 2 and Table 3). Furthermore, Alexandra is able to juggle two jobs (the formal and the informal) only because of the grandmother’s unpaid domestic labor (the informal nonmonetized economy). This connection between the domestic economy and employment in the larger economy enables many of the interviewed households to survive under current economic conditions. It is especially true for those employed in the private sector, where jobs are competitive and demanding in terms of time.

In addition to its reliance on informal resources, Alexandra’s household undertakes much of its daily consumption outside the formal economy. Alexandra pays cash to a private tutor for English lessons for her children. Food and clothes shopping is done at cheaper and virtually unregulated food and goods markets and not in the expensive private stores nearby, a situation typical for many other respondents. Many interviewed households also produced a wide range of goods and services for themselves: they fix their own appliances

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<th>Table 2. Multiple Economies of Interviewed Households in 1989 and in 1995*</th>
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<td>Total economies in interviewed households</td>
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* Multiple economies include economic practices of 71 adults in 30 interviewed households. Adult household members include ex-husbands who live in the same apartment and still share income and boyfriends who share income on a regular basis but do not live permanently in the household.

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<th>Table 3. Major Resources in Interviewed Households in 1989 and 1995*</th>
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<td>Households with the first source of income as:</td>
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<td>Second formal jobs and additional income**</td>
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<td>Pensions</td>
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<td>Help from relatives, friends, neighbors, ex-husbands, and boyfriends</td>
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<td>Source: Interview data. * Some households indicated several sources as equally important first source. These are included in all corresponding categories. ** Additional income includes informal jobs, alimony, and renting out extra living space.</td>
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and shoes, renovate apartments, cut hair, look after and educate children, and, when possible, receive food from relatives living in the countryside. In general, the interviewed households have reduced their formal consumption as much as possible since the transition. Their reliance on their own labor for the domestic production of goods and services has, therefore, increased. In turn, they have increased their demand on help from networks of friends and extended family. In several cases, increased domestic production has forced adult household members (typically women, but sometimes men) to leave jobs that generate cash and engage into nonmonetized class processes inside their homes.

Finally, understanding everyday lives in terms of multiple economies uncovers the continuity between current experiences and those under the Soviet system. For Alexandra and several other respondents, the housing problem, which originated in the Soviet past, foreclosed their employment opportunities under today’s capitalism. The impact of this condition from the past on their current lives is hard to overestimate. Alexandra, for example, confines herself to a marginal state job even though (similar to other interviewed single parents) she could handle a challenging private sector job as long as the grandmother performed most work in the domestic economy. Furthermore, the interviews revealed a certain destabilization of the Soviet-era gender and class hierarchies during the transition. For example, certain women had become primary wage-earners in their households. In many instances, however, the transition only enhanced preexisting hierarchies. Even Alexandra’s employment with the state, for instance, is jeopardized because, in continuation with the Soviet informal discrimination of working mothers, employers expect women to stay at home and rely on their male partners’ wage—a situation unrealistic for most Moscow households, many of which are headed by single women, have unemployed husbands or, as in the past, do not earn a “family wage” (Madison 1977; Saushkin and Glushkova 1983).

Mapping the multiple economies of Alexandra’s household highlights the complexity of and connections between economic and social practices that constitute its daily life. It would not be possible to account for these intricacies using only statistical indicators. This model also makes clear the dynamic relationship between class and gender processes, in which household members are engaged both inside the household and within the larger economy. Finally, applying the model to past and present household circumstances shows how combinations of multiple economies have changed along with related class and gender processes. These “other transitions” usually remain hidden and ignored despite their significance for household reproduction.

Mapping Other Transitions

In addition to using the model to understand the circumstances of a single household, I created actual maps of multiple economies using data from all interviewed households to produce a more generalized analysis of “other transitions.” Literally mapping the multiple economies of households renders visible—and, therefore, theoretically important—the hidden landscape of unprivileged economic practices and thus contributes to constructing alternative geographies of transition. While Alexandra’s household is unique in certain respects, it is not exceptional in terms of its reliance on multiple economies. Table 2 and Figure 5 show the degree to which interviewed households were embedded into various formal and informal economic activities prior to privatization (1989) and after (1995). Because this article analyzes the landscape of multiple economies in general terms, the very important differences between, for example, the single-parent and two-parent households, as well as those with and without the extended family, will not be addressed here. Table 2 summarizes various types of economies discovered during the interviews. Initially classified in detail, using the model of multiple economies, the economic practices were divided into four broad groups for the purposes of mapping: formal resources, informal resources, formal consumption, and informal consumption. Referring back to Figure 2 helps to see which economic activities have been included into each group. The map entitled “Multiple economies and households, 1989–1995,” shown in Figure 5, is the result of mapping the data aggregated in Table 2. It displays different types of economies for each household interviewed at household locations.

In Figure 5, circle size at household locations corresponds to the number of economies per household; the larger the size, the more diverse the economic and social resources of a particular household. Each circle is also divided into four parts, the size of which shows the relative importance of the broad categories of economies from Table 2 (see legend and the diagram in Figure 2 for explanation of these categories). By examining the composition of economies in addition to their total number per household, it is possible to see the relative role of formal and informal economies. The formal economies are shown in green, and the informal economies are shown in red.

The map reveals that all households depended on both types of economies in 1989 under state socialism.
and in 1995 under capitalism. The degree of participation in multiple economies ranges from 7 economies per household to as many as 19 economies per household, indicating that a household's access to formal and informal economies varies tremendously. The table also shows the average number of economies per adult, which reflects the degree of individual participation in multiple economies. In 1995, after privatization and other structural adjustment policies, there were 5.6 economies per adult, which empirically demonstrates that being at the intersection of several economies and their corresponding class and gender processes was a part of the daily life of each household member. The map also shows that the average number of economies per household had increased from 1989 to 1995. Similarly, the total number of economies for thirty households increased from 342 in 1989 to 399 in 1995 (Table 2), a per household increase from 11.4 economies in 1989 to 13.3 in 1995. This increase suggests that the web of daily economic and social arrangements had become more complex since the transition to the market began. It also suggests that the formal private monetized sector did not account for most resources or consumption. Households, instead, extended the range and variety of their resources and consumption options.

The formal resources available to households (shown in dark green) include wages or income from primary jobs, pensions and stipends, subsidies for children, and alimony payments. All households participate in formal economies in one way or another. In general, each adult has at least one formal source of income (wage or pension). Some combine retirement with additional work, which accounts for the average of 1.5 income sources per adult in 1995 (see Table 2). The average number of formal resources per household has increased from three in 1989 to 3.6 in 1995, largely because, since the early 1990s, all households receive subsidies for children. Unfortunately, these subsidies are so small that none of the respondents considered them a serious help. In general, formal resources accounted for just over a quarter of all economies, an amount that remained stable between the two dates (Table 2).

Informal resources, shown in dark red, include secondary and informal cash jobs, help with money, child care, and other services from relatives and friends, as well as the domestic production of food and clothes and housework in general. These resources are very diverse and consist of monetized and nonmonetized economies. Quite significantly (see Table 2), consistently for both dates, informal resources made up a much greater share of all economies compared to formal resources—36 percent versus 26–27 percent. On average in 1995 there were 4.8 informal resources per household and the number per adult was equal to two, both greater than

![Figure 5. Multiple economies and households, 1989–1995. Source: Interview data.](image)
the corresponding averages for formal resources; the importance of informal resources in 1989 is equally large. Clearly, informal resources have been indispensable, and, in this sense, households have successfully resisted modernization by either socialism or capitalism, as the abundance of dark red on the maps for 1989 and 1995 confirms.

The map in Figure 6 pictures the distribution of informal resources in greater detail by differentiating between informal work for cash, domestic production of goods and services, and inputs from networks. The map shows that many households have relied on income from various informal jobs (shown in red) under socialism as well as during the transition, and Table 3 highlights the relative importance of the informal jobs among household resources. In the past, respondents depended on a variety of income sources, but work for wages in the formal economy still was the largest source of income. This was no longer true by the mid-1990s, when primary formal-sector jobs supplied the majority of income for only half of the interviewed households, with the other half depending on additional sources (mainly informal jobs) for their main source of income. Despite an effort to legalize informal entrepreneurship through privatization, the informalization of monetized activities has only increased during the transition, a situation eloquently exemplified by Alexandra’s story. Even more than before, however, households rely on nonmonetized resources such as the domestic production of goods and services (shown in green), and inputs from networks in the form of help in kind (e.g., food and goods), with child care, and other unpaid services (shown in yellow). As Alexandra’s story demonstrates, these domestic and network-based economies allow the employment of household members and also compensate for the collapse of earning and consumption power.

Household participation in various economies of consumption changed significantly from 1989 to 1995 (see Figure 5 and Table 2). Formal consumption refers to shopping for food and other goods in state or private stores and consuming state housing and other state or privately provided services. These economies are shown in light green. Their share in multiple economies has visibly declined from 28 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in 1995.

Figure 6. Informal resources and households, 1989–1995. Source: Interview data.
1995. This means that privatization has not responded to consumer needs; instead of an increased reliance on the formal private market, households have withdrawn from formal consumption. Where did they turn? The tabular data and the maps derived from the interviews show that domestic production of goods and services and informal consumption make up for the reduction in formal consumption. In fact, growth in domestic production and various network-based inputs (in kind and as labor) presented in Figure 6 compensated for the inability of households to purchase goods and services in the formal market. In other words, production and consumption have shifted from the formal economy into households where they are performed as unpaid work, mainly provided by women (also see Pavlovskaya and Hanson 2001).

The second way to make up for the failures of the new private economy is to increase participation in informal consumption economies (shown in bright red) that include buying food and goods through workplaces or friends instead of in stores, as well as shopping at semi-informal goods and food markets. In the past, the distribution of goods and food products through workplaces (so-called zakazy) was an important resource for households and accounts for much of the informal consumption in 1989. In this way, as well as through networks of friends, households could survive the chronic shortages of goods and services characteristic of the Soviet era. But by 1995, informal consumption had not declined despite the apparent abundance of goods in private stores. Rather than shortages, households faced prohibitively high prices for (mainly imported) goods. Like Alexandra’s family, virtually all households did most of their clothes and food shopping at semi-informal markets where prices were lower. In general, the share of informal consumption economies in the total number of economies has increased from 11 percent in 1989 to 16 percent in 1995 (see Table 2 and Figure 6).

Comparing maps of multiple economies and their transitions to actual urban change produces results that are initially puzzling. The economy in this portion of downtown Moscow has grown tremendously during the few years since privatization. This growth manifested itself in the almost fourfold increase in the number of urban establishments in the study area, especially those in the previously underdeveloped tertiary sector (Pavlovskaya and Hanson 2001; Pavlovskaya, under review). But the urban transition and transformation of household economies did not proceed as expected by transition theorists and policy makers. While the tertiary sector expands, so too do the informal and non-monetized economies because households cannot afford to consume the newly available goods and services. A closer look at finer categories of urban establishments in combination with the interview data helps to answer the question why this divergence took place. Overall, the highest growth was confined to producer services that, in addition to finances and real estate, include professional, scientific, and technical services, administrative and support services, and information services (Pavlovskaya, under review). These services catered to various new private businesses. Consumer-oriented services, such as education, health and social services, and repair and food services remained scarce. In addition, they cost too much, and ordinary households do not use them, a situation that also applied to various retail stores. Lack of affordable goods and services leads to a greater reliance on informal monetized and nonmonetized resources and consumption. This analysis confirms some of the conclusions reported in Pavlovskaya and Hanson (2001).

Conclusion

Focusing on people’s everyday lives and local scales provides a complement to macroeconomic approaches to transition but also reveals the mechanisms of the constitution of social processes across multiple scales and economic spaces. A model of multiple economies of Moscow households enabled me to analyze the transitions in the daily economic practices as well as to make these typically overlooked economies and transitions visible through mapping.

Mapping multiple economies provides a new approach to understanding transition in post-Soviet Russia. This approach questions the prevailing visions of transition as a unidirectional movement from a formal economy of socialism to a formal economy of capitalism. Instead, it emphasizes the diversity of class and gender processes within households, the connections between past and present social hierarchies, and the mutually constitutive nature of social and spatial change. The household interviews eloquently demonstrated that, in addition to work and consumption in the formal state and private sectors, domestic work, informal cash income, and meeting ends using social networks play a fundamental role in reshaping urban society and class and gender identities. Households are routinely embedded in multiple economies and this embeddedness is the fundamental condition for their survival in this, using Michael Burawoy’s words, “first truly ‘poststructural’ society” that “rejected administered visions and investments in the future” (Burawoy 2001, 1113).

Alexandra’s household, “held together by a system of personal ties” (Burawoy 2001, 1113), has survived many
turbulent years since transition. When I recontacted her in 2000, however, Alexandra still lived in the same tiny apartment. She planned to retire in a few months (taking advantage of early retirement for lifelong service with the police), but her economic prospects were grim. Her informal income as well as potential job opportunities with friends disappeared after the financial crisis of August 1998. In addition, most private companies will only employ workers under age 35; Alexandra missed the opportunity for such employment while waiting to get a better apartment through her job with the police. Household income for four people including two 16-year-old boys will soon consist of only two tiny pensions. Despite their hardworking lives under the Soviet system and relatively successful efforts to circumvent the system during many years of the disastrous national economic policies of transition to capitalism, this household has been left to a marginal existence and bitterness. Without policies that can account for the circumstances of this and other households, policies that provide support not only to new private enterprises but also to multiple economies that make the survival of households possible, many Moscow households have been pushed to the limits of their ability to raise income, ensure household reproduction, and care for children.

The problem is that many of the multiple economies that allow household reproduction do not fit orthodox descriptions of economic activities. They are informal and nonmonetized, and they occur outside formal workplaces and/or inside the private spaces of households. As a result, the interconnected changes in the multiple economies of Moscow households, as well as the related changes in corresponding class and gender processes, all remain untheorized, understudied, unmapped. This research shows that “other transitions,” hidden from the theoretical lens of macroeconomic approaches, can be revealed, analyzed, mapped, and understood using the conceptual framework of multiple economies. This approach tells a tale of transition that is very different from those told by transition theorists, policy consultants, and traditional social and economic analyses. These differences, it is hoped, will lead to a different politics of transition that will empower ordinary households such as Alexandra’s to overcome economic devastation instead of being ruined by it.

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Notes

2. NAICS is a classification system based on SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) that was in use until 1997. To accommodate Moscow’s specifics, I created a certain number of categories (see Pavlovskaya 2002 for detail). Russia is changing its statistical and classification methods in order to make its data comparable internationally, and while no single system is in use now, the new classifications of economic establishments are similar to NAICS. Using these codes will also allow for analysis of the data collected in the future.
3. The interviews provided the information concerning a total of 71 current household members and 64 family members who no longer lived in the interviewed households but often played a crucial role in their daily lives (e.g., grandparents, [ex]parents-in-law, ex-husbands, and other relatives).
4. In the remainder of the article, I will refer to Alexandra’s mother as “grandmother” to indicate the importance of this subject position in many Moscow households. In addition to providing unconditional care to their grandchildren, grandparents typically perform a large amount of work in domestic economies on a daily basis, which is referred to simply as “help.”
5. Soviet communal apartments are a result of urban housing shortages. In these apartments, each of several families has one or two private rooms, and all share the kitchen and the bathroom.
6. Housing shortages were a major problem in large Soviet cities. In Moscow, mass housing construction did not begin until the 1960s. Many regulations ensured that only those in the greatest need for a larger living space were included on any waiting list. According to Alexandra, city bureaucrats said that her sons did not need privacy until the age of nine (at which point they would be considered to be of a different sex than herself), and, therefore, she was not entitled to a larger apartment when they were born.
7. In addition to city housing, many state agencies built free housing for their employees, which was an important job benefit in the context of prevailing housing shortages.
8. In 2000, Alexandra still received 86 rubles (just over $3) per month for each son.
9. Laundry services are drop-off places, with clean clothes available for pick-up in three to five days. While convenient, their quality was so low that many families preferred to do their laundry by hand.
10. This consists of buying cheap consumer goods abroad and reselling them in Russia in various ways (see Humphrey
1999 for the analysis of the post-Soviet trade, including the informal trade by the individuals).

11. Soviet divorced women or single parents were often stigmatized. Single parents, however, received significantly more benefits than divorced mothers because the latter were expected to receive child support from ex-husbands. In reality, however, child support payments were either insignificant or absent. Many interviewed women refused to collect formal alimony payments in order to have full control over their children.

12. For example, in their study of Soviet society, Zaslavskaya and Ryvkina 1991 defined as many as 78 different social groups using statistical data (quoted in Zaslavsky 1995), while traditional Marxism divided people into only two or three major classes based on their position relative to the means of production (see Gibson-Graham 1996b).

13. They include various types of noncapitalist exploitation such as community- or family-based. In addition to capitalist class processes, this school of thought identifies feudal, communal, ancient class processes, and self-exploitation as fundamental types of class relations present in modern societies (Gibson-Graham 1996b).

14. Such a graphic representation of a theoretical argument was inspired by Mingione (1987), who effectively utilized a diagram to show a “household reproductive mix.”

15. The term “household resources” as used here includes not only material or financial resources but a whole range of practices and strategies that support the everyday lives of households across multiple economies.

16. During the Soviet times, such research was not encouraged, and now it is limited by the difficulty of obtaining data and the lack of interest in studying such phenomena.

17. According to one of the main post-Soviet economic reformers, Stanislav Shatalin, up to 90 percent of the second economy was expected to be absorbed by the emerging free market (Shatalin et al. 1990; quoted in Treml and Alexeev 1994, 226).

18. Examples of paid work performed in private household spaces include domestic workers (Mattingly 1999), middle class women with young children in technical, clerical, and professional occupations (Christensen 1993), or people who run businesses out of and work for pay in their homes (Ahrentzen 1997).

References


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