The Gentrification of Harlem?

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Abstract. The process of gentrification has begun to affect the majority of large and moderately sized urban areas in the advanced capitalist world, and impressionistic reports suggest that Harlem may be undergoing gentrification. After reviewing some of the debates and arguments in the gentrification literature, we identify a number of indicators from 1980 census data and examine other housing and mortgage data through 1984. The results suggest that indeed gentrification has begun but that there are several potential limitations to the process. The number of wealthy black households in Harlem is relatively small, and if gentrification proceeds it will lead eventually to white in-migration and to the displacement of blacks.

Key Words: gentrification, Harlem, 1980 census, urban restructuring, displacement, New York City.

GENTRIFICATION, according to the 1980 Oxford American Dictionary, is the "movement of middle class families into urban areas causing property values to increase and having [the] secondary effect of driving out poorer families." Although the process often involves the rehabilitation of residential neighborhoods occupied by the working class, it can also occur in nonresidential areas where the building stock is economically obsolete but sufficiently sound that rehabilitation is viable. New York's SoHo, for example, was a predominantly industrial area as were many other recently gentrified areas occupying a waterfront location (Zukin 1982). Gentrification began as a predominantly residential process but in recent years has become more broadly based, involving a fundamental restructuring of central and inner city land uses (Fainstein and Fainstein 1982; Smith and Williams 1986). Along with residential restructuring, the process especially involves commercial redevelopment (boutiques for food, furniture, and pets as well as for clothes) and a new development of recreational facilities (from fern bars and discos to marinas and tourist arcades, such as Baltimore's Harborplace or London's Covent Garden). In different locations gentrification takes different forms, but the common thread is the renovation of old inner and central city building stock for new uses, generally associated with the middle class. Where it is residential property that is being renovated, the process usually occurs in working-class areas where the housing stock has been devalued through disinvestment or where, because of continuing urban development, the location of the neighborhood has become increasingly prized and therefore more highly priced, making gentrification a profitable option.

In this paper we examine the extent to which gentrification appears to be affecting Harlem, a neighborhood located on Manhattan Island in New York City. Perhaps the most trenchant national and even international symbol of black urban culture, Harlem seems at first sight a highly unlikely target for gentrification. Yet among Harlem residents, in the local press, and even in the international press ("Harlem. Black, tan, and white . . ." 1984; Kruger 1985), reports of gentrification are emerging. In addition to providing an empirical assessment of the process today, we offer conclusions about the future of Harlem and assess the conditions that could potentially limit gentrification there.

Background

As a systematic process, gentrification emerged on the heels of the urban renewal, slum clearance, and post-war reconstruction programs implemented during the 1950s and 1960s in most advanced capitalist nations. The term gentrification was apparently coined by Ruth Glass in the early 1960s:

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347
One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes—upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages—two rooms up and two down—have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period—which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation—have been upgraded once again. . . . Once this process of "gentrification" starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed (Glass 1964, xviii).

This is not the first period in which residential rehabilitation has occurred; there was sporadic rehabilitation in numerous nineteenth-century European cities, and a substantial number of urban workers were displaced by "The Improvements," as they were called in Britain, or by embourgeoisement, as it was called in France (Rodger 1982; Harvey 1985, 94–96). The difference between earlier experiences of rehabilitation and contemporary gentrification is that the latter is far more systematic and widespread; it is an international not a national process and is synchronized with larger economic, political, and social changes (Smith 1982; Kendig 1984; Williams 1984). Within affected cities it is highly concentrated spatially. It occurs especially, but not exclusively, in the inner city areas around the Central Business District, the area that used to be described in traditional Chicago School and ecological models of urban structure as the zone of transition (Burgess 1925; Griffin and Preston 1966; Rex 1968). If such areas are again in transition, it is an upward transition rather than the downward one envisioned by traditional theorists.

As the effects of gentrification emerged more clearly in the public eye and indeed as the process seemed to accelerate in many cities in the mid-1970s, a flurry of research began (for surveys see Laska and Spain 1980; Palen and London 1984; Smith and Williams 1986). In the United States this work tended to be highly empirical (e.g., Gale 1977; Laska and Spain 1980) whereas in Britain empirical investigations were tempered by a concern for theory (Williams 1976; Hamnett 1973). From this work it has become clear that there are obvious limitations to narrow, empirical (sometimes empiricist) case studies of gentrifying neighborhoods; equally clear are the limits to more abstract theorizing that may well identify some of the salient causes of the process but often does so at the expense of conveying the diversity of experience involved in gentrification (Holcomb and Beauregard 1981; Hamnett 1984; D. Rose 1984). The complexities of the process should neither become an excuse for neglecting the general patterns that prevail nor be dismissed as epiphenomenal irrelevancies. It is from this conviction of the necessity to match theoretical and empirical investigation that the present study of the gentrification of Harlem proceeds.

Debate over gentrification has emerged around three main questions: the significance of the process (or its extent), the effects of gentrification, and its causes. Under these three headings we shall attempt to summarize very briefly the major arguments. It will quickly become obvious that these three issues are closely interrelated.

Significance

In 1970 U.S. census data, probable signs of gentrification began to show up at the scale of individual cities. The process was tightly concentrated in a few neighborhoods accounting for a very small percentage of the overall area of individual cities (Lipton 1977). In the mid-1970s, a survey of local officials by the Urban Land Institute (1976) suggested that nearly half of U.S. cities with over 50,000 population were experiencing some level of rehabilitation in the inner city housing market. If there is little debate on these findings as such, there is certainly debate over what they mean. 1980 census data have been analyzed so far only at the neighborhood level for individual cities; researchers have not yet repeated Lipton's (1977) broader analysis for the nation's largest cities.

The debate is essentially this: is gentrification a small-scale, geographically restricted process that has little or no effect on the city as a whole, or is it the harbinger of a major restructuring of urban space? Advocates of what we might call the minimalist position, generally resort to data at the city or metropolitan scale to demonstrate the continuation of urban decline and the suburbanization of whites (e.g., Berry 1985), even if in some cases at reduced rates (see Nelson 1984). Only a few of the most accessible neighborhoods have been affected. In policy terms, gentrification is therefore seen as a solution to the urban problem 'and the problem of urban
housing" (Sumka 1979) and should therefore be encouraged. In the words of Sternlieb and Hughes (1983, 467) gentrification is a "triumph" that can potentially bring higher property tax returns and thereby enhance the "economic vigor" of the city (see also Kern 1981).

Against this some researchers argue that gentrification is part of a larger restructuring of urban space that is clearly well under way. This is most obvious in U.S. cities where there may already be "convergence toward the European model" of urban structure (Fainstein and Fainstein 1982). This model is characterized by a historically preserved urban center where numerous high-income residential areas have been maintained and where elite retail and commercial establishments are concentrated. Some see this "social Manhattanization" as already clearly evident in many U.S. cities (Williams and Smith 1986). Proponents of this position generally resort to data at the micro level (census tract or neighborhood), where the profundity of change from gentrification is most apparent.

Effects

The debate here is more complex and concerns the overall costs and benefits of gentrification. In what is probably the majority view, and one that certainly dominates most official policy toward the process, gentrification is lauded as the major hope for reversing the economic and social decline that still dominates the inner cities. The benefits, in terms of rehabilitated housing units, higher tax revenues, and a generally greater "economic vigor" are held to exceed the costs, especially displacement. In the first place, then, there is an argument over the extent to which poor and working-class residents are displaced from gentrifying areas, with proponents of gentrification maintaining that the extent of displacement and its effects are relatively unimportant. During the Carter presidency, when the administration actively attempted to encourage "revitalization," the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1979, 1981) eventually acknowledged displacement as a problem but downplayed its importance; 2 percent was the unofficial but widely accepted approximation of annual displacement in gentrifying neighborhoods. Although evidence is admittedly thin, available results suggest low rates of displacement, and so according to this argument no anti-displacement policies need be implemented; these would be premature and might retard "revitalization" (Sumka 1979).

Against this view, more recent evidence suggests that as many as 23 percent of departing residents in gentrifying neighborhoods are displaced (Schill and Nathan 1983, 7). Hartman (1979) and LeGates and Hartman (1981) have argued, on the basis of an exhaustive survey of displacement reports, that the problem is widespread, that government figures themselves indicate that 500,000 families are displaced annually from their homes, and that gentrification accounts for a sizable minority of these. Beyond the statistics, the impressionistic evidence suggests that the problem is real. The fear of gentrification in target neighborhoods is certainly widely reported (e.g., Daniels 1983a), and in areas where the process has begun, everyone has a story about old friends and families next door who were moved out.

Opponents of gentrification therefore attempt to point out that the costs of the process are unevenly felt and that the notion of overall gain for the city is misleading. "The city" is not an undifferentiated pool of abstractly equal individuals but rather comprises a stratified population whose experience of gentrification is highly differentiated (Smith and LeFaire 1984). Some gain and some lose. In a recent survey, which suffers from some vital methodological problems, Schill and Nathan (1983, 119) assert that although displaced households face higher rental costs, they may also respond to questionnaires that their housing is better and they feel better off. Displacement is thereby construed as potentially beneficial to working-class residents, and it is a short step from here to a policy of benign neglect. This view has been flatly rejected as systematically underestimating the adverse effects of gentrification (Hartman, Keating, and LeGates 1982; LeGates and Hartman 1986).

Causes

The strictly ecological explanations referred to above—the treatment of gentrification as a re-invasion of the zone of transition—have certainly been invoked as well as critiqued (London 1980). But such explanations of an apparent
reversal in social ecological patterns have generally been post hoc; description is construed as explanation, with little or no insight into the deeper reasons for urban change. Thus the debate over causes has come to center on the issue of production-based vs. consumption-based explanations. Especially in the U.S. the process has generally been explained as a result of changing lifestyles and demographic changes (the maturation of the baby boom generation, higher numbers of single adults living together, higher female labor force participation rates, and so forth). Together these lead to altered consumption patterns and preferences, leading to a heightened pattern of demand for housing.

Some of these ideas have been challenged (e.g., Walker and Greenberg 1982), and an alternative tradition has developed emphasizing the role of the state and capital in producing both the potential and the reality of gentrification. Williams (1976, 1978) emphasizes the role of British building societies in providing the capital for transforming the inner city landscape. Others have theorized that it is the longer-term movement of capital in the built environment, creating a “rent gap” in the inner city, that creates the opportunity for profitable capital reinvestment in redevelopment or housing rehabilitation. More generally, some form of “collective social action” rather than individual decision making is necessary to promote the process (Smith 1979, 545; 1982). The emphasis here is squarely on the primary role of capital (private or public) in fashioning the urban landscape. Clearly production and consumption must be related, but the determination of how they are related and which predominates cannot be made on the basis of empirical studies alone. Each of the different positions in this debate, then, involves a larger theoretical commitment concerning the way in which urban space is continually patterned and repatterned.

We cannot address all of the questions provoked in these debates in the context of Harlem. In particular because gentrification in Harlem is at best in its infancy and because the area has an inordinate number of vacant and abandoned buildings, it will be difficult to use this empirical study to advance our knowledge of the effects of gentrification. Precisely because the process is in its infancy, however, this study can offer some clues concerning causes, and because of the presumed difficulty of Harlem as a target for the process, the study should also yield some conclusions on the significance of gentrification. Finally, there is the question of methodology and particularly the issue of how to identify gentrifying neighborhoods within Harlem. There has been remarkably little discussion of this question in the literature and so a further aim of this paper is to begin to identify statistical indicators of gentrification. Most previous research has tended to rely on the impressions of local “experts” (planners, academics, real estate agents, community activists) as indicators of the process because sufficiently sensitive neighborhood-level data were scarce. As Clay (1979b, 40) concluded, “statistical indicators are not likely to yield early clues to middle-class reinvestment.” In fact, as gentrification matures, statistical indicators are increasingly available. One would expect to see changes in the occupational and socioeconomic character of affected neighborhoods as well as in the property market, and indicators are available for identifying such changes. Specifically, one would expect increases in the percentage of college graduates and of professionals in gentrifying neighborhoods, and these data are available in census reports. Neither is a sensitive indicator, however. The spatial distribution of college graduates is highly differentiated, but some of the most dramatic increases in this indicator appear in poor neighborhoods where 1970 levels were extremely low. The percentage of professionals might have been a sharp indicator, but occupational definitions changed sufficiently between the 1970 and 1980 censuses that the results are not comparable.

Two indicators do emerge, however, from the census. Income and rent levels increase dramatically in most gentrifying neighborhoods; per capita income provides the most sensitive indicator of income changes, and median contract rent offers the most comparable data on housing costs. Beyond the census, housing market data give a fairly clear picture of reversals in the devaluation cycle (Smith 1979) and the beginnings of reinvestment. We propose these as statistical indicators that are sufficiently sensitive to detect gentrification in Harlem and also have wider applicability.

Harlem as a Target for Gentrification

Harlem is an international symbol of black culture. Two themes dominate most contemporary images of Harlem. The first, a nostalgic image now, is the Harlem of the Harlem Renais-
sance or of the Black Panthers (Anderson 1982; Lewis 1981). The second theme is Harlem the ghetto, one of the largest concentrations of black working-class and poor inhabitants in the U.S. (Osofsky 1971). Along with this image goes a picture of physical dilapidation, social deprivation, crime, and drugs. If the two themes are different, they are not incompatible; each obviously portrays only a part of the real Harlem. In the first place, then, this is a case study of the extent of gentrification in an internationally known black neighborhood.

Constructed initially as a mixed middle- and working-class area in the last decades of the nineteenth century and located on the north edge of Central Park in Manhattan (Fig. 1), Harlem's housing stock is comprised of five- and six-story tenements and townhouses. As the white middle class moved out to the suburbs and the black migration from the South accelerated during World War I, Harlem's population became increasingly black, and by the 1920s the Harlem Renaissance placed the area squarely at the forefront of black culture. New construction had effectively ceased by the beginning of the war, however, and housing disinvestment began seriously during the Depression. Ever since, there has been little significant reinvestment in Harlem except for undertakings that were partly or wholly funded by the state. By the time that Harlem again made international headlines in the 1960s, it had been transformed into a slum and quickly became the most notorious symbol of black deprivation in America.

Although the neighborhood's history of disinvestment and decline is typical of other neighborhoods facing gentrification, Harlem is quite atypical in other ways. Most important, Harlem is a solidly black area. According to the 1980 census, 96 percent of Central Harlem residents are black. Gentrification in the U.S. has certainly led to the displacement of black and other minority populations, but because many of the black urban neighborhoods had been targeted earlier by urban renewal and because white middle-class gentrifiers have generally been less squeamish about moving into white working-class areas, the earliest neighborhoods affected by gentrification have usually been white or at least mixed. With some exceptions, heavily black neighborhoods have been perceived as harder to gentrify. An obvious exception is Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. (Gale 1977), which has undergone gentrification since the mid-1960s, but this comparison points to

Figure 1. Manhattan and Central Harlem.
another important characteristic of Harlem: its size. Harlem is much larger than Capitol Hill. Its total population is over 300,000 and it covers an area of about four square miles. Perceived by the middle class (especially the white middle class) as highly threatening, having a universally depressed housing market, and possessing a cohesive social and political identity, Harlem represents a challenging obstacle for gentrification in New York City. Its location on the other hand—immediately north of Central Park from midtown Manhattan—does promise considerable economic opportunity for developers who initiate gentrification. With this much at stake, it is little wonder that on the one side Harlem is seen as a supreme test for the gentrification process, while on the other gentrification is seen as a powerful threat to Harlem residents who are dependent on the availability of housing at rents well below Manhattan market levels.

Harlem is susceptible to gentrification primarily because of its location. During the 1970s, New York City lost population, falling from a peak of nearly 8 million in 1971 to just over 7 million in 1980. (It has since stabilized and even registered marginal population increases.) Manhattan followed this trend, falling from 1.54 to 1.43 million during the decade, but in the same period the number of households in Manhattan actually increased by 2.5 percent (Stegman 1982). Along with this increase in households, the gentrification process, which had certainly been evident in the city before 1970, began to flourish, especially in the southern and western parts of Manhattan. SoHo, Tribeca, the Lower East Side, Chelsea, Clinton, and the Upper West Side all experienced considerable rehabilitation of old building stock (Fig. 1). By the late 1970s, Harlem represented Manhattan’s largest concentration of working-class residences with virtually no gentrification. Thus, despite the continued population loss at the city level during the 1970s, gentrification shows up strongly for the first time with census-tract data from the 1980 census, especially in Manhattan but also in Brooklyn. A recent study by Chall (1984) documents the process in New York City but seriously underestimates its extent.2 It is against this background of extensive rehabilitation in areas closer to midtown Manhattan, rapidly rising housing costs and rent levels, and an extremely low citywide vacancy rate of about 2 percent that the gentrification of Harlem has come onto the agenda.

There are several purposes, then, to this study. First, it offers a case study of an urban area with an international reputation; the gentrification of Harlem would indeed be an an event of some significance. Second, this study documents the process at its inception, therefore providing a baseline against which future trends can be assessed. Partly out of disbelief that past trends would be reversed, most researchers have tended to study neighborhoods only after gentrification is an accomplished fact. Even if the process is truncated or halted, a study of its origins can assist in comprehending the reasons for success or failure. Third, this study is meant to cast some light on the debates over the causes and significance of the process. There is little disagreement that Harlem represents a difficult target for gentrification; to the extent that it takes place, we should be more inclined to see the general process of gentrification as tenuous and long term. If it were temporary and small in scale, why would developers and incoming residents make such long-term investments here rather than in neighborhoods perceived as socially and economically less risky? The present study will also make tentative conclusions about the potential effects of the process in Harlem and will contribute to the discussion over production-side and consumption-side explanations. The theoretical conclusions, however, will be limited and tentative, pointing in certain directions rather than claiming to prove or disprove specific theoretical propositions.

The Study Area

There are different definitions of Harlem, but it is generally considered to be the area stretching for two miles north of Central Park in Manhattan. On the East Side it extends south to 96th Street while on the West Side it goes only to 125th Street. Generally, it includes Manhattan’s Community Districts 10 and 11 and most of the northern part of Community District 9. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, some new construction and renovation began in the eastern section above 96th Street, and there were also the beginnings of renovation in the western section, especially in Hamilton Heights. But the heart of Harlem lies in the central area directly north of the Park. Unless this area of Central Harlem is gentrified, it is unlikely that the rehabilitation and new construction along the edges
### Table 1. Statistical Profile of Central Harlem Population and Housing, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Central Harlem</th>
<th>Manhattan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent population black</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income ($)</td>
<td>4,308</td>
<td>10,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent high-income households (&gt;=$50,000)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent low-income households (&lt;$10,000)</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent college graduates (adults with &gt;= 4 years of college)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median contract rent ($ per month)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent managerial, professional, and related occupations</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private residential property turnover rate per year, 1980–84 (%)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population change, 1970–80 (%)</td>
<td>−33.6</td>
<td>−7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent housing abandoned</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1972, 1983); City of New York, Department of City Planning (1981); Real Estate Board of New York (1985).

will amount to anything very significant. Thus far, media reports of gentrification have focused more on the eastern and western edges of Harlem, with far fewer reports of activity in the central area. We therefore take Central Harlem as the focus of our research.

The study area is defined by the boundaries of Community District 10 (Fig. 1). This area stretches from 110th Street in the south to 155th Street in the north, and from Fifth Avenue in the east to Morningside and St. Nicholas parks in the west. Table 1 provides a statistical profile of the area, comparing it with Manhattan averages in order to emphasize the social, physical, and economic contrast between Harlem and the rest of Manhattan. The picture conveyed by these statistics is clear. Central Harlem’s population is predominantly poor, working class, and almost totally black; it has declined by one-third in the last decade. Proportionately Central Harlem has a tiny middle class, a low percentage of college graduates, and a small number of high-income households. Median rents are 25 percent lower than the Manhattan average, one-quarter of all housing units are abandoned, housing conditions are bad, and the private housing market is soft. The contrast with the rest of Manhattan could hardly be more marked. Within this general picture, however, there is considerable variation.

The study proceeds with an examination of 1980 census data and the changes that took place during the 1970s. From this we shall be able to identify areas, roughly at first, where some sort of social, economic, and physical change may be beginning. We then look at more detailed data, especially on the housing market, which will give a more refined and more up-to-date view of changes taking place in the area. We conclude with an assessment of changes that have occurred, a discussion of the limits and constraints upon the gentrification process in Central Harlem, and an attempt to assess the likely effects of the process on present residents.

### Census Results for Central Harlem, 1970–1980

We first examine several key indicators from the 1980 census for evidence of gentrification in Harlem. In particular, we examine changes over the decade in per capita income, median family income, median contract rent, and racial composition. The most obvious pattern to emerge from these data is the continuation of decline. While per capita income in Manhattan increased by 105.2 percent during the 1970s (with no correction for inflation) and by 96.5 percent throughout New York City, in Central Harlem the increase was only 77.8 percent, about 20 percentage points lower than the inflation rate for the decade. The standard of living for Central Harlem residents therefore dropped markedly during the 1970s. As might be expected, the decline of real income was even more marked in terms of median family income. Median contract rent, on the other hand, rose by 113 percent, further exacerbating the decrease in living standards, although again this was lower than the Manhattan and New York City averages (which were 141 percent and 125 percent, respectively). The percentage of blacks
remained steady at 96.1 percent compared with 96.3 percent in 1970 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972, 1983).

But this general trend of economic decline is not universal. A disaggregation of the data at the census-tract level provides clear evidence of an opposite trend in some areas. The most sensitive indicator was per capita income, and the second most sensitive was median contract rent. In nine tracts, per capita income increased more than the city average, and in these same tracts rent increases were also generally above the local average, indicating a change in the housing market as well as a change in the social and economic status of residents. We would expect per capita income increases to be a more sensitive indicator of gentrification than median family income because figures for family income do not include unrelated individuals, who are usually prominent in gentrification. (In Central Harlem, only five census tracts demonstrate above-average increases in family income, and in at least three of these tracts, it is highly unlikely that any gentrification is taking place.) The question is whether there is a spatial pattern to these larger-than-average increases in per capita income. Such a pattern would be expected in the case of gentrification because the process tends to be tightly concentrated in specific blocks and neighborhoods, at least in the beginning. Figure 2 shows the distribution of census tracts with increases in per capita income that are above the city average, and it is immediately evident that a distinct spatial concentration exists. There are two corridors of more rapidly rising incomes, one on the western edge of the district, the other on the eastern edge. But is this pattern the result of gentrification, or does it result from some other set of processes? To provide a preliminary answer we look at specific census tracts; this will not tell us definitely which of the tracts are experiencing gentrification, but it will help us to eliminate those tracts where income rose rapidly for other reasons.

The pattern that emerges from this closer examination is that while gentrification might be occurring in the western corridor, the idea of an eastern corridor of gentrification is not tenable. The eastern corridor, from 126th Street to 139th Street (Fig. 2), comprises a low- and moderate-income urban renewal project (Lenox Terrace) as well as several blocks of severely deteriorated tenements and townhouses. There is no obvious explanation for the above-average

Figure 2. Above-average increase in per capita income, 1970–80.
increases in income here, but it is at least possible that this part of Harlem is experiencing some spinoff effect from the concentration of office employment (since 1971) in the new Harlem State Office Building, immediately to the south on 125th Street. Field observation discloses no signs of significant residential rehabilitation or redevelopment since 1970, and we are inclined to conclude that the area is not experiencing any gentrification. The remaining tract in the eastern corridor, to the south of Marcus Garvey Park, may however be undergoing the beginnings of gentrification. There has been some rehabilitation of townhouses here, and the area has been targeted by the City of New York in its auction of city-owned properties (see below). At best, however, the process is in its infancy.

In the western corridor, there is firmer evidence of the beginnings of gentrification. The indicators suggest an above-average increase in income and rental indicators, especially above 126th Street, and there is an area-wide increase in high-income households, but the data on the number of professionals and college graduates is more ambiguous. This is particularly surprising because the western corridor borders on the City College of New York, which would be expected to contribute graduates and "professionals" to the gentrification process. Still, the census data suggest the real possibility of gentrification beginning in this area. A more precise analysis demands that we examine a broader range of data, especially concerning the housing market.

**Housing Market Trends Since 1980**

Between 1980 and 1984 there are ambiguous trends in the Central Harlem housing market, and these are shown in Figure 3, which graphs data on the volume and value of private residential sales (Real Estate Board of New York 1985). The first trend is the decline in volume of sales in 1982 with the onset of the national recession; this was matched by a decline of prices in 1983. There is little doubt that these declines represent national trends; nationally, sales volume declined 17.5 percent in 1982 over the previous year, and prices actually declined in many parts of the country for the first time in over a decade ("Home sales low . . ." 1983). But the second important trend is that although the volume of sales did not pick up appreciably after the end of the recession in 1983, prices rose dramatically in 1984. This would tend to support the general perception of realtors, public officials, and residents of the area that the market has heated up considerably but that there remains something of a wait-and-see attitude among potential investors; speculative investment has increased since 1984 but appears to involve smaller rather than larger investors (C. Douglas 1986).

As with the census results, these sales data for the area as a whole do not give the full picture. Figure 4 shows the geographical distribution of the turnover rate of private residential properties in the five years from 1980 to 1984. The map shows that the highest rate of private sales occurs in and around the same western corridor that emerged from the census data as a possible locus of gentrification. Further it is apparent that in the most active areas, turnover rates are over 7 percent per year, appreciably more than the Manhattan rate of 5 percent and more than the 3.3 percent rate for Central Harlem as a whole.

This indication of increased activity in the real estate market concurs with earlier results. The Harlem Urban Development Corporation (1982) concluded that in the area of the West Harlem South Triangle—the southwest section of the study area bounded on the south by 110th Street, on the west by Manhattan and Morningside avenues, and on the northeast by the St. Nicholas Avenue diagonal (see Fig. 2)—there was a considerable increase in sales activity between 1978 and 1981. A subsequent report reached a similar conclusion (AKRF 1982). The data through 1984 suggest a secular strengthening of this trend in the western corridor as a whole.
Although it is the western corridor that emerges as the area undergoing significant changes in social composition and in the housing market, there are two other parts of Central Harlem where rehabilitation and redevelopment are beginning to take place. First, there is the Harlem Gateway area, the name of which suggests vividly the intentions of federal and local agencies. Lying between 110th and 112th streets, Fifth Avenue and Manhattan Avenue, the major asset of the Gateway is that it hugs the northern edge of Central Park (Fig. 2). This area was designated a Neighborhood Strategy Area by HUD in 1979, meaning that it was targeted for HUD’s major development programs and is also targeted by Harlem Urban Development Corporation and various City agencies. By 1982, there were at least five Section 8 low- and moderate-income federal projects active in the area, providing substantial rehabilitation of nearly 450 housing units. Since then, several new projects have been announced, and it is recognized today that this area is on the “verge of major redevelopment” (Daniels 1984). Most important are several condominium projects being undertaken both on Lenox Avenue and on the western edge of the Gateway. At least four new or renovated condominium buildings are in the planning or construction phase, several of them involving coalitions of local developers. The largest and most significant development, however, is a 599-unit condominium being constructed by the Rockefeller-inspired New York City Housing Partnership. Ground for this project was broken in October 1985.

The significance of the Housing Partnership condominiums—named Towers on the Park—lies in the extraordinary financial undertaking involved. In the summer of 1985 the City received a $6 million Federal Urban Development Action Grant to subsidize the condominiums, and this triggered an unprecedented Chemical Bank loan of $47 million to finance construction (Oser 1985). This is by far the largest private residential capital investment in Harlem in decades and nearly eight times the total private mortgage financing that went into the whole of Central Harlem in 1982. In this one development can be seen both the severity of redlining in the past and the potential for gentrification in the future. As construction begins, the total projected cost of Towers on the Park is $70.5 million; while some units are to be earmarked for moderate-income tenants at approxi-
mately $60,000, the majority will be sold, according to current estimates, at between $80,000 and $125,000 (Oser 1985).

The second area of some activity since 1982 is the area around Marcus Garvey Park. The census data on income and rent give a mixed picture, suggesting above-average increases in the tract to the south (Fig. 2) but below-average increases immediately adjacent to the park. Most of the activity in this area began two years ago when the City began its sealed bid auction program with 12 brownstone properties that had been taken in property tax foreclosure proceedings. Three-quarters of these were in the immediate vicinity of Marcus Garvey Park. The properties were to be rehabilitated by those who won the auction, in what was seen as a trial run by the City. According to Roy Miller, Director of the Harlem Office of Community Development and Neighborhood Preservation, only 1 of the 12 properties had been completely renovated two years after the auction and 7 were still awaiting the beginning of construction (pers. comm., April 13, 1984). Nonetheless the City administration was determined to continue the auction program and to expand it. The area around Marcus Garvey Park has remained a prominent focus in this program and has also been highlighted in media publicity (Daniels 1983b; Coombs 1982). Between January 1980 and June 1983, a total of 30 townhouses were sold in the tract adjacent to the park, the third highest total for Central Harlem. Physical inspection of the area also indicates significant rehabilitation activity.

**The Extent of Gentrification**

The western corridor of Central Harlem is experiencing the beginning of gentrification. Above-average increases in income and rent levels as well as in the number of high-income families were matched by a rapid increase in sales activity. This simultaneously rising property market and rising socioeconomic profile in the neighborhood constitute the hallmark of gentrification. Further, this combination is unlikely to occur in Harlem for any other reason. The socioeconomic change indicates that the heating up of the property market is not simply the result of speculation, although the latter certainly occurs (C. Douglas 1986), most likely beginning with the early 1980s surge in property values. Likewise, the rising property market indicates that socioeconomic changes in the western corridor are tied to an upward revaluation of the physical structures. Also significant is the fact that in this western corridor there is no detectable racial change, no white influx. This suggests that so far we are witnessing a process of black gentrification.

Although gentrification has begun in the western corridor, albeit on a small scale, it is important to be cautious about its extent. Even in this area, which is most affected, the process is as yet very sporadic. Beyond the western corridor, only Marcus Garvey Park and the Gateway appear to have experienced gentrification, and there too it is both sporadic and preliminary.

To emphasize the preliminary character of the process, it is possible to compare sales data for Central Harlem with similar data for other clearly gentrifying areas in Manhattan. Whereas Central Harlem had a total of 635 residential property transactions in the five-year period from 1980 to 1984 (for a total of $30 million and an average sale price of $47,500) clearly gentrifying areas of Manhattan such as Yorkville and Clinton (Fig. 1) experienced much greater levels of activity. Yorkville, on the eastern border of East Harlem and the Upper East Side, had 121 transactions in 1980 and 1981 for a total of $106.1 million and an average price of $877,000. Clinton, west of Eighth Avenue between 42nd and 57th streets, had 142 sales in the same two-year period for a total of nearly $46 million and an average sale price of $322,000 (AKRF 1982). Although these data are not strictly comparable because they represent different housing stock in different areas, the comparison does suggest that while the property market in parts of Central Harlem is beginning to show signs of gentrification, it remains on a comparatively small scale. Further, it is important to remember that the 1970 base levels of the indicators used here (e.g., income, rent) are lower than the city average, as are property sale prices, and so large percentage increases, especially for the small census tracts in the western corridor, do not necessarily mean large-scale activity.

It is worth commenting briefly on the location of the upward changes that have begun so far. Given that the core of Central Harlem represents some of the most deteriorated and devalued properties, one would expect the process to begin at the margins. In some cases, such as the northern part of the western corridor, this might
be considered spillover from already gentrifying areas such as Hamilton Heights. Elsewhere, however, this is not the case; the Marcus Garvey Park area is not close to any other gentrifying area, and in the southern sector of the western corridor, the metamorphic outcrops of Morningside Park have been employed as an effective barrier to social and economic intercourse between Harlem below and Columbia University's Morningside Heights above the hill. It can hardly, therefore, be considered spillover. Rather, the common denominator between these areas is a matter of economic gradient—the existence of a severe ground rent gradient (Smith 1979), such that land values are high to the south and west and inordinately low in the middle of Central Harlem. Since it is less risky in market terms to attempt to level off the rent gradient at the margins where higher land values act as an economic anchor than to begin in the center, it is the edges that attract initial attention. As we shall see below, this is also the strategy of the City's Redevelopment Plan for Harlem.

Constraints, Limits and Momentum: The Future of Gentrification in Central Harlem

As gentrification is only in its earliest stages in Central Harlem, the anticipation of change is obviously much greater than the reality. On the one hand, local municipal officials and public and private real estate developers are promoting the possibilities for redeveloping Central Harlem. They emphasize the optimistic potential of redevelopment as well as the fragility of the process, the constraints and obstacles, and the necessity of overcoming them. On the other hand, those who oppose gentrification (because wholesale displacement is likely and finding adequate and affordable alternative housing is difficult) stress the fact that once gentrification begins in a neighborhood it is difficult to stop.

How realistic is this anticipation of the gentrification of Central Harlem? What are its likely effects? Gentrification is a novel process precisely because it abrogates previous constraints and limitations; it is a reversal in economic and social terms. Central Harlem, however, presents a more formidable set of constraints and limitations than most neighborhoods. We shall consider four of these: the supply of gentrifiers, the negative image of Central Harlem, building size and zoning limitations, and the supply of private mortgage financing.

The Supply of Gentrifiers

At present it is clear that despite prominent press reports featuring individual white gentrifiers in Harlem (Coombs 1982), the vast majority of people involved in rehabilitation and redevelopment in Central Harlem are black. First, the census data register no significant decrease in the percentage of blacks, even in those areas where gentrification appears to be beginning or is threatened. In the western corridor, all of the tracts remained greater than 90 percent black, some almost 100 percent. Second, of the 2,500 applications received for the first round of the City sealed bid auction, approximately 80 percent were black (Donald Cogsville, President of Harlem Urban Development Corporation, pers. comm., 1984). What is the likelihood that black Harlem residents will be able to carry out the major part of the redevelopment and rehabilitation of Harlem themselves as envisaged in the City plan?

In the 1982 auction, the City required that each entrant earn at least $20,000 per year (P. Douglas 1983), but in light of the difficulties experienced with that auction, the 1985 auction was open only to households (or pairs of related households) with substantially higher incomes. In today's market, rehabilitation costs are estimated to be more than $135,000 for a medium-sized townhouse, and this requires a minimum annual household income of between $50,000 and $87,500 for potential renovators ("Profile of a winning sealed bidder" 1985).

The 1980 census data reveal that only 262 households in Central Harlem had incomes above $50,000. In the whole of Manhattan, the number of black households earning more than $50,000 did not exceed 1,800. Clearly the gentrification of Harlem will not proceed far if it is simply a process of "incumbent upgrading" (see Clay 1979a) by Harlem residents. A similar conclusion was reached by E. M. Green Associates in a 1981 marketing study for a co-op building in the Gateway area (AKRF 1982). The same study, however, concluded that the potential would exist among non-Harlem blacks. It is certainly possible that the economic vacuum in Central Harlem could be filled by non-Harlem
blacks, but it is unlikely. All the empirical research on the origin of gentrifiers suggests that few of them actually return from the suburbs (Laska and Spain 1980; Gale 1977); for every returning suburbanite there are an estimated four or five gentrifiers already resident in the city (Smith 1979). Should Central Harlem follow this established trend, its major reservoir of potential gentrifiers will be New York City residents. If high-income black households are to be the main source of gentrifiers, it is doubtful that the process will proceed far since there are fewer than 8,000 such families (earning over $50,000) in all of New York City. The inescapable conclusion is that unless Harlem defies all the empirical trends, the process might well begin as black gentrification, but any wholesale rehabilitation of Central Harlem properties would necessarily involve a considerable influx of middle- and upper-class whites. This brings us to the second constraint.

The Image of Central Harlem

If the gentrification of Central Harlem is dependent on a substantial white influx, white perceptions of the area are critical. To the vast majority of middle-class whites, Central Harlem is perceived as a dangerous place. However accurate this image, it is also perceived as a black-defined geographical space in the city, and by this fact alone is therefore threatening. Thus it is impossible to disentangle white middle-class fear from racist perceptions about the area. The reality of Central Harlem is quite different from the ideological image, and yet the image is a trenchant one and will remain so for years to come. It is probably the most immediate barrier to white in-migration.

It is difficult to assess how much this negative image will ultimately preclude white gentrification in the area. The experience of Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. and a number of other neighborhoods suggests that white gentrification of nonwhite neighborhoods can occur. But Harlem is much larger symbolically as well as physically and thereby perceived as more threatening yet more intriguing by the white middle class.

Building Size and Zoning Limitations

While the immediate target of rehabilitation efforts is the area’s townhouses, the gentrification of Central Harlem as a whole will depend ultimately on whether or not the large stock of tenements and vacant lots can be rehabilitated and redeveloped. Without extensive public subsidies, Central Harlem’s tenements will have to be rehabilitated by private developers, probably as condominiums and co-ops, given the current unattractiveness of rental housing in New York City. To date, this kind of rehabilitation and conversion has occurred in only one or two isolated cases, and it is unclear whether private developers will find rehabilitating Central Harlem’s relatively small tenements economically attractive.

Almost all the community’s residential lots are currently zoned for relatively low-density development, which effectively limits new construction to about six stories. Although private developers currently prefer to build large apartment houses in order to maximize their returns, Central Harlem’s relatively low land prices might enable them to construct townhouses and low-scale apartment buildings. Alternatively, a successful challenge might well be mounted against the zoning regulations in the name of a new Harlem Renaissance.

The Supply of Private Mortgage Financing

Recent mortgage data show the dearth of private institutional financing in the area. Of the $12 million invested in Central Harlem mortgages in 1982 (nearly all of which was for large multifamily dwellings) HUD provided 47.5 percent for six separate buildings. Most of the remaining mortgage money (another 34.5 percent) was purchase money mortgages, that is, seller-financed mortgages. There were more than 30 private institutional lenders, mostly small local lenders, but no one of them accounted for more than 2 percent of the total mortgage money. That is, no single private financial institution ventured as much as $240,000 in the entire area in 1982 (City of New York, Commission on Human Rights 1983).

This finding heightens the possibility that where property transactions have been brisk, notably the western corridor, the sales were small in scale and often self-financed or seller financed. Without substantially increased private financing, large-scale rehabilitation and redevelopment will not take place. This is clearly perceived by all public and private insti-
tutions involved in the redevelopment of the area. Thus the City’s Redevelopment Strategy for Central Harlem, proposed in 1982, begins from the assumption that “with drastic reductions in federal housing and economic aid” resulting from the Reagan cuts, the emphasis would have to shift toward private market investment and public-private partnerships: the “private sector . . . would have to play a pivotal role” (City of New York, Harlem Task Force 1982, i–ii). It is difficult to predict the extent to which private financial investment will begin to flow into the Central Harlem housing market. For decades Harlem has been almost completely redlined, and despite a secular increase in renovation activity at the national scale in the early 1980s, the Chemical Bank loan of $47 million represents the first significant influx of private capital into Central Harlem. The outcome of the Towers on the Park condominiums will be crucial.

The constraints on gentrification in Central Harlem are, then, considerable, but not necessarily insurmountable. There are also strong forces pushing for the redevelopment and rehabilitation of the neighborhood’s housing stock. Prime among them are the obvious assets of Central Harlem’s location and transportation access. As professional, managerial, and administrative employment continues to expand in Manhattan, as the number of households increases, and as the housing market tightens, Harlem becomes an increasingly attractive candidate for gentrification. But despite its substantially underpriced housing in relation to the rest of Manhattan and the economic opportunity this represents, there is no automatic transformation of Harlem into a gentrified “haven.” In locational and economic terms, there is no doubt that the potential for gentrification is there; the question is whether these economic and locational forces are powerful enough to overcome the constraints.

Perhaps the most important determinant of Central Harlem’s future is the success or failure of the City’s strategy for the area. The City is particularly important because it is the major landlord in the neighborhood. The conventional wisdom is that about 65 percent of the housing units in Central Harlem are City owned, but the actual breakdown of ownership is more complex (Table 2). The City owns just over 35 percent of the Central Harlem housing stock and another 26.4 percent is either public housing or was constructed with public assistance. The City currently anticipates taking over 5,000 additional private units in tax foreclosure proceedings, reducing the proportion of private units to below 30 percent. Figure 5 gives a picture of the concentration of City-owned housing in the area.

As one aspect of their policy, the City auctioned 12 townhouses for rehabilitation in February 1982, and in August of that year, Mayor Koch released copies of a Redevelopment Strategy for Central Harlem, prepared by a special task force (City of New York, Harlem Task Force 1982). The report calls for a selective targeting of “stronger” anchor areas in Central Harlem in the attempt to induce a redevelopment that is “economically integrated” (p. 2). The City’s target areas are shown in Figure 6. The strategy is to bolster the areas where the private market is becoming active (the western corridor, essentially) and to use anchor areas to the south (the Gateway) and the north (the stretch from Hamilton Heights to the comparatively well off Strivers Row where disinvestment has been less marked and private lenders still operate) in order to encircle the heart of Harlem. As one participant put it, the plan is to “circle the wagons around” and move in from the outskirts (Donald Cogsville, pers. comm., April 20, 1984).

By 1985, the City government had successfully maneuvered through and around much local opposition (Daniels 1985a) and put 149 additional townhouses up for auction; 1,257 bids were received, and the winners paid between $2,000 and $163,000 for the properties. The average was $50,000, and of the winners, 98 went by prior agreement to residents of Commu-

| Table 2. Ownership of Housing Units in Central Harlem, 1983 |
|-----------------|--------|-------|
| Ownership       | Housing units | %     |
| Public housing  | 8,144  | 14.6  |
| City-owned housing* | 19,588 | 35.2  |
| Publicly assisted private housing |  | |
| Mitchell-Lama | 2,520 | 4.5   |
| Federal Title I | 3,528 | 6.4   |
| Urban Development Corp. | 501 | 0.9   |
| Private        | 21,399 | 38.4  |
| Total          | 55,680 | 100.0 |

Source: City of New York, Department of City Planning (1983).

* Buildings taken by city through in rem process.
Figure 5. Distribution of City-owned housing units as percentage of total housing units.

Figure 6. City of New York Redevelopment Strategy Areas.
nity Districts 9 and 10 in Harlem (C. Douglas 1985). Perhaps most significant is that City officials succeeded, with the help of a $6 million grant, in convincing the Freedom National Bank to provide purchase and renovation loans at the below-market interest rate of 7.5 percent. Together with the Chemical Bank deal, this agreement suggests that private capital is beginning to perceive Harlem as a viable and perhaps even lucrative investment especially when backed by public funds.

Conclusion

From our examination of data on social changes in Central Harlem up to 1980 and of transformations in the housing market through 1984, we conclude that the initial stages of gentrification can be observed in Central Harlem, especially in the western corridor. Compared with four years earlier when the most recent report on the question was issued (AKRF 1982, 76, 87), there are certainly more substantial signs of incipient gentrification. But little momentum has yet been achieved. If these conclusions are necessarily tentative, the study has the added value of providing an empirical base for evaluating the trends that will emerge in the late 1980s.

In terms of the theoretical debates reviewed earlier, the results of this case study are also tentative. The fact that the process has begun at all, that gentrification is even on the agenda in Harlem, lends support to the claim that we are witnessing not a curious anomaly but a trenchant restructuring of urban space. The Harlem experience accords with the view that the process involves “collective social actors.” In this case, it is not private capital alone that has played the leading role. Not until 1985 did a large potential influx of private mortgage capital begin to materialize. The state, in a number of institutional guises, has been most heavily involved in facilitating an upward momentum in the housing market; the leadership role has been taken by the local state—the City of New York.

The City proposes a redevelopment strategy that will benefit Central Harlem residents, avoid large-scale gentrification, and produce an “economically integrated” community. The City states explicitly that this “can be achieved without displacing the present residents of Harlem” (City of New York, Harlem Task Force 1982, 1,2). In one very real sense, this is more possible in Central Harlem than elsewhere. The City owns such a vast stock of abandoned buildings (many of them vacant) and undeveloped land that it is possible for substantial rehabilitation and redevelopment to occur before low-income residents are directly threatened with displacement. But for the City’s privately based redevelopment strategy to succeed, two prerequisites are crucial. First, Central Harlem will have to attract a large number of outside residents, most of whom may be black at first, but many of whom will necessarily be white as momentum builds. Second, the area will have to attract much larger quantities of private financing. Should these prerequisites be achieved, Central Harlem could be transformed from a depressed island of disinvestment into a “hot spot” of reinvestment, integrated into the Manhattan housing market. This would ultimately mean that large numbers of community residents would face displacement. Thus for Harlem as for many other areas that have undergone gentrification, “economic integration” may be an impossible hope and “a little gentrification” may be too unstable a state to survive for long. The City redevelopment strategy admits as much: in Harlem, “economic integration” means bringing in rich people and “social balance” means an influx of whites.

Gentrification may only be one piece in a larger urban restructuring that will fundamentally alter the face of Harlem. The conclusions of our research make it difficult to disagree with Harold Rose’s prognosis on the future of black working-class neighborhoods. “If the evolving spatial pattern of black residential development is not significantly altered,” according to Rose (1982, 139), the next generation of “ghetto centers will essentially be confined to a selected set of suburban ring communities located in metropolitan areas where the central city black population already numbers more than one-quarter million.” We might add the corollary that if the evolving spatial pattern of gentrification in the central city continues, then not only will the suburban ghettos burgeon, but the inner city ones will shrink at the hands of white middle-class migrants.

We are not predicting that Central Harlem will inevitably become a white neighborhood. Apart from the City’s policy toward the area, there are two other major determinants of Central Harlem’s future: the condition of the national and
Gentrification of Harlem

New York City housing markets and the effectiveness of political opposition. If the housing market remains strong and opposition is weak, then gentrification has a better chance of building momentum. If as part of a larger economic recession the housing market also declines or if opposition to the threat of a gentrified Harlem is sufficiently great, then the process may be halted. Another important question concerns the cultural revival that Harlem is currently experiencing, with the reopening of the Apollo Theater, the announcement of a new Multi-Media Arts Center on the site of the Renaissance Ballroom ("$14.5 million arts project . . ." 1984), and the "discovery" by the white middle class of several of Harlem's restaurants and clubs. Bus tours around Harlem have already attracted thousands of tourists. Ironic as it sounds, this emerging "New Harlem Renaissance" may unwittingly ease the gentrification process as significant numbers of whites visit and begin to feel comfortable in Harlem. Thus, according to The Harlem Entrepreneur Portfolio, which promotes itself as "Harlem’s newest brownstone newsletter," "The joys of living in Harlem are endless. The main one being a sense of community." ("Profiles in brownstone living" 1985).

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that for Central Harlem residents, gentrification is a "Catch 22." Without private rehabilitation and redevelopment, the neighborhood's housing stock will remain severely dilapidated; with it, a large number of Central Harlem residents will ultimately be displaced and will not benefit from the better and more expensive housing. They will be victims rather than beneficiaries of gentrification. At present, there are no plans for this contingency, either in the City's Redevelopment Strategy or elsewhere; none of the development strategies for Central Harlem even admit the likelihood of displacement. As Harold Rose (1982, 148) so perceptively puts it in the broader context: "Needless to say, there appears to be little concern regarding the social and economic implications associated with the present spatial reorganization upon the future of urban blacks, or for that matter upon the future of the city."

Rose might easily have been generalizing from the Harlem experience and the reaction of political and planning officials to the effect of gentrification on the working class. For not only is the potential problem ignored or simply denied; gentrification has even been construed as the solution to the housing problems faced by Harlem residents. At the groundbreaking for the Towers on the Park condominiums, U.S. Senator Alfonse D'Amato was confronted by organized community protestors chanting opposition to the gentrification of Harlem. Calling the condominium project "beautiful," and "New York at its best," D'Amato glared at the protesters and, as The New York Times described the scene, then declared, "'I'd like to sing too,' and broke into a brief, off-key aria: 'Gen-tri-fi-ca-tion. Hous-ing for work-ing people. A-men.' " ("Disharmony and housing" 1985).

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Notes

1. By townhouses, we mean three- to five-story residential structures with brick or brownstone fronts. This includes many brownstones, but in Harlem "brownstone" is a misleading label for these structures as many do not have brownstone fronts.

2. Chall makes much of aggregate citywide data that do not show any absolute reversal of suburbanization trends (at least up to 1980), and so downplays the extent of gentrification. In fact, if one examines per capita income changes, rather than household income, and if one is prepared to examine spatially contiguous groups of census tracts and their internal changes, a much clearer picture of gentrification emerges. The most significant aspect of the 1980 census in this respect is precisely that gentrification shows up at the census-tract level for the first time. This is immediately evident by mapping per capita income and median contract rent increases for Manhattan, where the southern and western part of the island show dramatic rises. The findings demonstrate the substantial spread and expansion of the process since 1970. See also Marcuse (1986).

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